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Abstract 
This thesis explores how cultural encounters between politically active youths in Jordan and global 
narratives regarding significant political incidents between 2010 and 2015 affect the category of 
being an activist. The incidents include: the Arab Spring; internal demands for democratization; 
increased radicalization; and the terror group Islamic State (IS) murder of a young Jordanian pilot. 
The narratives are respectively; the academic narrative by the political scientists Curtis Ryan and 
Marty Harris; and the official narrative by Jordan’s royal leader King Abdullah II; and narratives by 
Jordanian, politically active youth who are attempting to distance themselves from both of these 
dominant narratives. My main argument is that intersubjectivity, understood as a subject’s 
awareness of common experiences shared with other subjects, is highly influenced by the power of 
the narratives. The narratives by politically active youths are collected during five months of 
fieldwork in Jordan’s capital Amman and the suburb Dibarn. The theoretical fundament for 
analyzing and discussing the findings in this thesis includes; theory of narratives by Michael 
Jackson; theory of power by Michel Foucault; theory of authoritarianism; and research results in the 
Middle Eastern region by Asef Bayat, Samuli Schielke & Henri Onodera. My main conclusion is 
that the fight over the narratives of the development of Jordan is highly affecting the politically 
active Jordanian youths’ negotiation for position and space for action. In that way, the research 
question for this thesis is addressed; based on ethnographic research among Jordanian politically 
active youth, this thesis asks how narratives of these young Jordanians reflect the influence of 
recent and significant political events on their negotiation for position and space for action. 
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Introduction 
Shortly after arriving back in Jordan I spent a sunny morning running between the shops in Webdhe 
- one of Amman’s most multicultural areas - searching for the only local English newspaper the 
Jordan Times. I was keen on spending some time in the well known Paris Circle reading the news in 
the midst of the busy city life. One of the shopkeepers asked me what on earth I wanted with that 
newspaper, “I am interested in information about Jordan,” I replied. The shopkeeper answered 
with a laugh and said “You guys want to know everything about us and we ourselves don’t want to 
know anything at all”. Maybe he had a point. It is true, that I wanted to learn more about the 
country that began as a case study for university and eventually became the country I call my 
second home. It is also true, that his statement reflected one of the main aspects streaming from the 
academia about Jordan since the Arab Spring - that there, ‘nothing really happened’. This, I 
realized, actually contradicted Jordan’s royal leader King Abdullah II’s narrative, in which he 
claimed that political reforms initiatives have been made since the Arab Spring. 
 
My awareness of these contradictions increased when I started interning for a Non-Governmental 
Organization (NGO) in 2013. In this time, I worked closely with youth and communication. Over 
the years I have spent a great deal of time with Jordanian youths who are an active role in society. 
With this in mind I disagreed with the shopkeeper’s remark; that Jordanians do not care about 
domestic and international issues. Furthermore, I noticed misconceptions between the dominant 
narratives and how it differed from my experiences in the country. Mostly, I had sensed how a 
certain political awareness about the various internal and regional incidents over the years, were 
often expressed by the politically active youth. This made me curious as to the possible relationship 
between their political awareness and the young activists’ intersubjectivity. This is not only how 
subjectivities are affected by both private and public settings, but also the awareness of common 
social relations with the self and others. In this case of interest, how narratives about such may 
influence on the intersubjectivity for politically active youth. 
 
One particular change, which occurred in Jordan, was an increased fear of consequences that could 
result, from the turmoil in the region. This was clearly felt in early February 2015, when a video 
was released in which the terror group Islamic State (IS) burned a young Jordanian pilot: Muath al-
Kasasbeh to death after an unsuccessful mission in Syria (Jordan Times, 2015a). This event led to 
King Abdullah II promising to avenge the young pilot’s death. Shortly after these promises, I was 
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with some friends outside on a balcony, when we heard a loud and heavy noise. It came from above 
when four F16 planes appeared in the blue sky. It was fighter planes coming back from an attack 
against IS and were flying over the capital to send a strong signal of protection to its citizens. The 
people around me became anxious about a potential internal instability or threats from outside, 
while in the same moment another stated: “this is nothing, everything will be fine again”. He had a 
point. I had also experienced how, despite big happenings, it takes only a short time in Jordan, for 
things to fall into routine again. 
 
Was the shopkeeper then right about Jordanians not caring enough about domestic and international 
issues? Or was it an outcome of the increased fear I had noticed affecting the youth? Could the lack 
of reactions be a result of the Academic Narrative that ‘here nothing really happened’ having an 
impact on the youths’ otherwise attempt to be politically active? Could it be that the King’s Royal 
Narrative already promised security and change, and thus no further action was required? From 
having listened to these various narratives about Jordan while being in the middle of the country, I 
developed an insisting stubbornness to find out more about how narratives potentially could have an 
impact on the youth’s intersubejctivity and in that way the category of being an activist. 
 
As will be shown, this led to various narratives by Jordanian activists. Two being active in unions; 
respectively Mustafa leading the Worker’s Union and Ali in front of the Democratic Youth Union, 
both being active pre-2010. And four other young activists called Fadwa, Aisha, Hadia and Thaer 
that were involved in the Jordanian uprisings, their fundament for activism initiated around same 
time as the regional Arab Spring. Furthermore the reproduction of the Royal Narrative will be 
presented by the elitist Osama1, experienced with youth development programs. On the basis of the 
above reflections, I came to ask the following questions; 
                                                 
1
 All the names of the informants are anonymous 
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Private picture of F16 planes  
 
Questions 
Research Question 
Based on ethnographic research among Jordanian politically active youth, this thesis asks how 
narratives of these young Jordanians reflect the influence of recent and significant political events 
on their negotiation for position and space for action. 
 
Working Questions 
What kinds of divergences in relation to the significant political events are expressed by the King 
and the politically active informants through their narratives? 
 
How do the young political activists reflect the interactive meetings between themselves and the 
regime in relation to the recent significant political incidents? 
 
How do the young political activists express the Academic Narrative and the Royal Narrative to 
influence on the category as activists and their potential for a strong narrative? 
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The Academic Narrative 
The following will portray the dominant Academic Narrative regarding the Jordanian uprisings 
which will contribute to a better understanding of the context and act as a backbone for the 
informants to lean on. This will mainly be done with references to the American political scientist 
Curtis Ryan (2011) with years of expertise in Jordan and its internal tensions, and the American 
political scientist Marty Harris (2015) who recently did an analysis of Jordan’s youth after the Arab 
Spring. The two main points are that ‘nothing really happened’ during the Jordanian uprisings – 
which began in late 2010 – and that the youths and their actions are to some extend acknowledged. 
This will later be discussed in contrast to a point about a ‘third-in-between’ response to the Arab 
Spring, that the Danish political scientist Morten Valbjørn (2012) made instead of either ‘transition 
to democracy’ or ‘transition to nowhere’ (Valbjørn, 2012: 30-31). 
‘Nothing Really Happened’ 
As a starting point, it is important to introduce the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring was sparked in 
Tunisia in December 2010 when the young street vendor Mohammad Bouazizi set fire to himself 
after fights with the authorities leading to protests across Tunisia and the overthrow of the dictator 
Ben Ali in early January 2011. The riots quickly spread over the region significantly in Egypt 
(Kjersgaard, 2011: 5) where massive protests at the famous Tahrir Square led to the fall of President 
Mubarak. Inspiration to protest also came to Jordan and its people. 
 
The first main argument from the Academic Narrative is that in relation to the Arab Spring, 
‘nothing really happened’ in Jordan. This is highlighted by both Ryan and Harris as they make a 
comparison to the more remarkable political incidents in the neighbouring countries. Ryan states 
that the number of Jordanians in the streets; “varied from hundreds to thousands, but not the tens 
and even hundreds of thousands” as seen in Egypt (Ryan, 2011a: 564). Harris in this sense agrees 
with Ryan and says that Jordan is lacking in a “full-scale uprising” (Harris, 2015: 1) being smaller 
than other parts of the Arab world without revolutionary demands (Ibid.: 3). Furthermore, Ryan 
states that Jordanians demanded reforms; “but not regime change” (Ryan, 2011a: 564) unlike the 
counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt (Ryan, 2011b: 383) which have led to; “little effective change on 
the Jordanian political system itself” (Ibid.: 367). This seen in relation to how reformers and 
democratic activists in Jordan; “have had limited effectiveness in achieving reform and change” 
(Ibid.: 389) which has never challenged the Jordanian state or the royal rule (Ibid.: 378). The second 
argument is that the Jordanian youths are acknowledged for playing a part in the Jordanian 
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uprisings in 2011. Ryan highlights their role in the demonstrations that led to the dismissal of the 
Prime Minister and afterwards through organized demonstrations and activism via social media 
(Ibid.: 386). Harris adds to this argument by concluding that even though protests since 2012 are 
said to have weakened the force for change in Jordan (Harris, 2015: 4); the young activists are still 
important to Jordan’s future (Ibid.: 11).  
 
The Jordanian youth are described as neither with the state nor the traditional opposition. This 
reflects the desire for a new kind of political activism (Ryan, 2011b: 385). This is related to youth 
growing up hearing about promises of reforms from previous political events seen in the light of 
how most of them are well-educated not holding back their political views (Ibid.: 389-390). On the 
other hand it is argued that ‘regional relativism’ both referring to the fear of chaos as seen in the 
region if protests broke out internally, and the opinion that even though it is slow, Jordan has come 
a long way politically and economically, has made the Jordanian active youths hold back from 
pushing for reforms (Harris, 2015: 6). 
The Jordanian Uprisings 
According to the Academic Narrative about the Jordanian uprisings, they officially began 2010. 
People in various demonstrations demanded new and more democratic electoral laws and changes 
in the gerrymandered electoral districts where Palestinians are under-represented in comparison to 
East Jordanians. When a new law did not live up to their criteria, they went to the streets again, 
demanding and end to corruption and more democratization (Ryan, 2011a: 564). Shortly after, the 
Arab Spring emerged in the region, which inspired the Jordanians to gather in demonstrations with 
thousands of people demanding democratic changes and dismissal of the Prime Minister (Ryan, 
2011b: 383). According to Ryan the main demonstrations started in the southern city Dibarn on 
January 7, 2011 and soon after spread to Amman claiming that economic privatization had gone too 
far and there was a lack of political liberalization (Ryan, 2011a: 565). This was the main motivation 
for the ‘southern movement’. The Southern Movement was largely based on non-party activism in 
the towns of Karak and Tafileh that supposedly largely consisted of independent youth 
organizations which focused on problems of privatization, Amman-centric investment and 
corruption (Ryan, 2011b: 384-385). According to Harris, he believes the main protest broke out 
January 14, 2011 with ten thousand people demonstrating around Jordan followed by frequent 
Friday protests for the next two years (Harris, 2015: 3). 
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The demonstrators from 2010 and 2011 are described as coming from the middle class with East 
Jordanian background, including both women and men, Muslim and Christians (Ryan, 2011a: 570). 
In addition, Jordanian-Palestinians also participated which came out as a bigger threat to the regime, 
since the usual opposition normally only consists of Islamist, leftists or solely Palestinians (Ryan, 
2011b: 367). In terms of differences in ethnicity and gender, the well-known demonstration which 
occurred on 24 March, 2011 is described as being the most inclusive (Ryan, 2011a: 571). Here, 
youth movements supposedly also played a big role forming the March 24 Shabab Movement, a 
peaceful movement that was organized via social media (Ibid.: 573), where youth stayed all day and 
nigh at the Ministry of Interior Circle in Amman (Ryan, 2011b: 386). However, what started as a 
peaceful movement, ended the next morning, when they were broken up by furious nationalist 
youths and hundreds were injured (Ibid.: 386). The anti-reform youth that mobilised from rural 
tribal areas outside Amman, viewed the demonstrators as revolutionary and Palestinians as being 
disloyal to Jordan (Ryan, 2011a: 574) also branded as Islamists that would get rid of the King to 
establish an Islamic Palestinian rule (Valbjørn, 2011: 113). 
 
The Jordanian Regime responded to the 2011 protests with dismissing the Prime Minister and the 
government (Ryan, 2011b: 387). In addition, the King took initiative to The National Dialogue 
Committee, gathered various societal voices, though the proposal for better reform was written 
under surveillance of the regime (Ibid.: 387-388). According to Ryan however, the reforms by the 
regime were simply cosmetic (Ibid.: 367). The political reforms should among other things have 
included a transfer of some royal powers to legislature and parliamentary elections, however the 
cosmetic reforms have been slow, falling short of demands and have been simply overshadowed by 
the many changes of prime ministers. The reformist demands with a focus on economy shifted into 
more political demands such as change to electoral law and the constitution, when the Muslim 
Brotherhood got involved. In late 2012, mass protests and riots broke out as a result of increased 
fuel prices and an overthrown regime was demanded (Harris, 2015: 3-4). 
 
Of the outcomes from the protests seen in recent times, both Ryan and Harris acknowledge certain 
changes. According to Ryan the spirit from the March 24 Movement has since expanded with 
online debates and open forums reflecting that youth are still active attempting to build up a climate 
for more open debate about issues (Ryan, 2011a: 575). Not only is there an expansion of online 
discussion, but a grown scepticism due to the lack of any real change. It seems that the regime is 
 12 
only making simple attempts for reforms to hold reformers and foreign criticism at bay (Ryan, 
2011b: 387). According to Harris, he agrees with the increased openness for debate and claims that 
Jordanian youths have learned from experiences of other activists in the region, now rather planning 
for models instead of revolutions (Harris, 2015: 7). This has increased the pressure on the Jordanian 
regime since it is proven to bring about change. The more chaos that has followed in Syria and 
Egypt however, eases the strain on the kingdom when it promotes a ‘don’t rock the boat attitude’ in 
to its citizens, as a fear of regional spillovers (Valbjørn, 2013: 316). 
 
One of the main regional consequences for Jordan is the millions of Syrians that were forced to flee 
after the outbreak of the civil war, resulting in nearly 630.000 refugees entering Jordan since 20112. 
Of the challenges can be mentioned extra economic social and political expenses (Ryan, 2014: 145) 
which have not gone unnoticed by the Jordanian population (Harris, 2015: 6) for example when 
Jordanians feel that the Syrians are taking up a big part of the business sector which creates tensions 
between the groups (Jordan Times, 2015b). The existence of Islamic State (IS) also influences 
Jordan in different ways. One includes the thousands of Jordanians, who have joined IS or the 
previous division within the population as to whether or not they should participate in the 
American-led coalition against IS (Al-Monitor, 2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107 UNHCR, Found October 2015 
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Delimitations & Conceptual Clarifications 
This chapter will give insights about my intentional limitations and active selected concepts, with 
the aim of structuring the best way possible towards answering the research question. It is heavily 
influenced by the Finish anthropologists Samuli Schielke (2010) and Henri Onodera (2009) with 
their important research about Arab youth particularly in Egypt after the Arab Spring. 
The Importance of Intersubjectivity 
Although it might have seemed relevant to the theme of this thesis to include terms such as ‘civil 
society’ and ‘social movement’, my previous academic engagement means I have developed a 
sceptical approach towards such terms. To argue against their use I find inspiration from Henri 
Onodera (2009) who points out that the former is normatively problematic, since it refers to the 
need of a ‘democratic opening’ in the Middle East. His argument that NGOs in this context are 
often ineffective, prompting activists to rely more on personal networks (Onodera, 2009: 48) is 
consistence with my experience in Jordan. The critique of ‘social movement’ is not only based on 
the origins in North American traditions distanced from Middle Eastern ones, but further that 
activists and related actions should not be underestimated because they do not fall under the same 
category of this term (Ibid.: 49). In my previous work with social movement theory and movements 
in the Jordanian context this underestimation has, frankly, provoked me, which partly explains why 
this theory is not used in this thesis. It will be highlighted how some Jordanian politically active 
youths felt patronized from the oppositional critical parts of society for not delivering the 
‘alternative plan’ about political changes. Here it was inspiring to include how a defence against 
having concrete visions and goals was to at least doing something instead of doing nothing (Ibid.: 
59) since some of the informants also used this argument. Moreover it is claimed that the term of 
social movement often points towards religious movements though religiosity is not the norm for 
the average contemporary Arab political active youth (Ibid.: 49). An observation also reflected in 
my experience in the field where religious characteristics were limited among the active youth. 
 
This leads to another argument of delimitation: based on my affiliation with Jordan including active 
youths, I decided not to focus on religious activism. As a foundation for this I find inspiration in the 
argument that ‘there is too much Islam in the anthropology of Islam’ and there is a need to focus 
more on existential emotional aspects (Schielke, 2010: 1). This critique should be understood in 
relation to the presentation of Islam as a perfectionist ethical project, undermining the fact that 
Muslims, like any other individuals, follow both moral and immoral aims (Ibid.: 2-3). When 
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seeking understanding of what a Muslim life consists of, a more nuanced insight about what living a 
life involves is needed (Ibid.: 5). This recognition also contributes to the aim of better 
understanding intersubjectivity. When having a more open-ended view, it can possibly lead to more 
insights about different kinds of directions and meanings (Ibid.: 14) which is reflected in the open-
structured methodological approach to this fieldwork. Here, inspiration to state tendencies of the 
Jordanian politically active youth will be found in a focus on collective identification in relation to 
social environment in which they act out political events (Onodera, 2009: 49). However, I choose 
not to focus intensively on the common division of the population between Jordanians and 
Palestinians-Jordanians since the assumption of identity characteristics as ethnicity is not thorough 
enough to understand the participants in the development of Jordan. 
 
With the aim of getting closer to how Jordanian politically active youth negotiate their position and 
space for action in relation to various narratives, one of the thesis’ main focuses will be on 
intersubjectivity. In that way, I will not only focus on individual subjectivity understood as a 
subject’s formation through appraising and realizations of awareness and actions, from either 
intimate settings or from bigger societal events. I will also highlight the social relations between the 
self and the others resulting from continuous dialogues, that intersubjectivity is described as 
(Jackson, 2002: 22). With the understanding of intersubjectivity as the subject’s awareness of 
common experiences shared with other subjects, intersubjectivity is the foundation for an 
individual’s self-understanding and how one would like to present themselves (Hastrup, 2003a: 10). 
From Regional Arab Spring to Local Hirak 
Since some informants not only distinguish between the following concepts but also make distance 
to them there is a need to clarify the definitions of ‘Arab Spring’ ‘Jordanian uprisings’ and ‘hirak’ 
(movements). ‘Arab Spring’ refers to the regional series of protests that were kick-started in Tunisia 
late 2010. ‘Jordanian uprisings’ is the English term for the demonstrations and riots that appeared in 
Jordan after the start of the regional Arab Spring. ‘Hirak’ is local Arab term, described as ‘informal 
political movements that came to be known as hirak’ with strong involvement from youth pushing 
for governmental reform and against corruption (Identity Center, 2014: 2). Though it will be 
elaborated in the analysis, there is additionally a strong distinction between ‘the Social Hirak’ and 
‘political hirak’. The first was initiated in the suburb Dibarn in 2006 by workers for labour rights 
with the aim of protect the poor from corruption, but it is claimed to be badly influenced by the 
Muslim Brotherhood getting involved in 2012, with their focus on electoral law, making it a 
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‘political hirak’ (Appendix A). ‘Hirak shabab al Jordani’ refers to Jordanian youth movements, 
started in 2011, to people all over Jordan demonstrating, working with campaigns and protesting 
together (Appendix D). For all the concepts it is crucial to point out that for this thesis, the purpose 
of demonstrating will be understood as raising awareness of issues and trying to activate the passive 
in a more collective way (Bayat, 1997: 66). The definition of ‘activism’ is ‘any kind of human 
activity – individual or collective, institutional or informal – that aims to engender change in 
people’s lives. As an antithesis of passivity, ‘activism’ includes many types of activities, ranging 
form survival strategies and resistance to more sustained forms of collective action and social 
movements’ (Bayat, 2002: 3). 
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Importance of the Youth 
This chapter will elaborate on the importance of youth in the Arab region and contribute with more 
insights about young Arabs and their characteristics including various results from research in the 
field. In continuation of the above chapter, it will also take inspiration from Schielke and Onodera 
as well as the Iranian professor Asef Bayat (1997, 2002, 2010 & 2013). 
Acknowledgement of Youth 
The importance of young people, as seen for example in political ideology where regimes and 
supportive organizations attempt to win young people’s respect because they can be manipulated 
and socially shaped, is also observed in the modern Middle East. Since the youth as an analytical 
category was acknowledged, it has represented a period with its own cultural values and norms seen 
in relation to social change. The youth has become of high importance in the modern Arab region 
since demographic changes have left 60% of the region’s population aged under 30 years old 
(Hoffman & Jamal, 2012: 169). Some of the related challenges include higher demands for work 
and housing in a modern way of life that can easily become restless (Bæk Simonsen, 2005: 7-8). 
 
Here ‘youth’ is often defined as young persons representing a certain age category but also a 
socially constructed category with several characteristics related to time and culture. When ‘youth’ 
represents a sociological reality as social conditions during a human development, it can be 
described as a ‘life stage’ between childhood and adulthood. It represents a time before going into a 
more adult stage where persons stand between stages of vulnerability and responsibility for oneself 
and others. Being young is, in this respect, a social condition of neither being dependent nor totally 
independent (Bayat & Herrera 2010a: 4). This was expressed by Jordanian informants with their 
worries about their future and families while still being under the wing of the parents. 
 
Although this is relevant, however, I will argue for the importance to including more specific 
features in the definition of Jordanian youth, thus challenging the understanding of youth as a 
category. This is in particular highlighted in the fact that, while the most commonly age category 
for youths is between 15 and 30, even those in their 30s, 40s and 50s can consider themselves 
young (Bæk Simonsen, 2005: 7). This was also expressed by the informants in their 40s and 30s 
lastly pointing out that he still considered himself as young because he was not married yet. 
Moreover, the definition of ‘young person’ often incorporates  a structure determined by biological 
facts of being young, including cultural behaviour, claiming social and cultural spaces, acting 
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rebelliously and worrying about the future (Bayat & Herrera, 2010a: 4-5). Though the Arab youth 
still point out unemployment as the main concern (Arab Youth Survey, 2015: 12) the rise of IS has 
also become a major concern and 51% of young Jordanians are concerned about the government’s 
ability to deal with the extremism (Ibid.: 10). 
 
In the aim of understanding the young Jordanian activists, it is crucially important to include key 
historical factors such as economical, political and cultural perspectives relating to lifestyle and 
livelihood. This is to understand the concept of a global generation and to understand how concepts 
have shaped the generational consciousness (Bayat & Herrera 2010a: 6). The way informants’ 
narratives reflected global surroundings indicated the need in the analysis and discussion to 
incorporate the overall level of how young Jordanian activists can be seen in the light of a global-
local perspective. The context for many informants is a new era, where iconic imagery of human 
rights have created moral and political compass for a ‘the new world order’, where the hope for 
rights, justice, democracy and gender equality arose (Ibid.: 7). 
Complexity of Being Young 
The analysis reflects that being young is divided by several complexities such as culture, class and 
gender, but that especially the youth in the global south, including the Middle East, have a harder 
time fulfilling the expectation of ‘youthfulness’ since they are often expected to grow directly from 
children to adults (Bayat & Herrera, 2010a: 6). This reflects how it can be difficult for the young 
Jordanian activists to act as a collective challenge to the moral and political authorities, bringing in 
another point about the category of youth. Bayat suggests that ‘young people’ have to turn into 
‘youth’ as a social category which means transforming into social actors -  process named as 
challenging by the informants who pointed out the need for continuous organized fights to have 
their demands met. This also raises the point that modern cities offer more diversity and opportunity 
for youths to express their individuality. This includes several arenas such as public areas, shopping 
malls and local street corners as important for the formation and expression of collective identities 
(Bayat, 2010: 31) though I will argue that such arenas are criticized for being the only places 
Jordanian youths are able appear amid a lack of other options. 
 
Of several mentioned life conditions and personal characteristics directly or indirectly mentioned 
during the narratives by the Jordanian activists as important for their subjectivity, the following 
reflects similarities to Egyptian youth. Despite the fact that informants rarely specified religious 
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affiliations, all grew up in religious settings. This is just one of the sources for how complex life can 
be for Arab youth, consisting as it does of elements from both revivalist piety and liberal 
secularism, which should not necessarily be seen as opposite divisions (Schielke, 2009: 161). It is 
more an expression of how one’s subjectivity and identity is practiced dialogically and constituted 
by several voices and experiences, both internal and external, which has made people commonly 
shift between different roles and identities. Therefore a dialogical notion of identity and subjectivity 
is needed to understand the complex nature of moral and immoral experiences (Ibid.: 165). This is 
especially relevant for the focus on intersubjectivity. 
 
This leads to Arab youth often experiencing several difficult choices and inner conflicts where one 
of the main issues is the clash between their fantasies and expectations for success and happiness 
versus their reality. This can possibly clash with the values of community and family including the 
expectation of being ‘a man’ able to take care of oneself and the family (Schielke, 2009: 171-172). 
This partly explains how young people work hard to gain respect (Ibid.: 168), reflected in various 
times during the narratives. The informants expressed how the average young Jordanian is 
frustrated about achieving a decent life (Ibid.: 173) which is increased by a certain boredom they 
can feel giving them a sense of emptiness from lack of possibilities, future and hope (Ibid.: 175). 
The challenge of fulfilling decent wishes such as work and marriage, can seem hopeless without a 
decent income, since without it, the Arab youths cannot be independent or afford marriage, a state 
which not only decreases the meaning of life but moreover provides a feeling of ‘being stuck’ 
(Bayat & Herrera, 2010a: 9). 
 
Very relevant for how intersubjectivity of the informants is reflected in the structure of their 
narratives from the surroundings that may affect them. The immense challenge for youths in 
Muslim countries of struggling with their youthfulness, claiming rights and shaping identities in a 
post-9/11 time (Bayat & Herrera, 2010a: 8) indicates that outcomes of international policies and 
global flows can effect the youth in Muslim societies (Ibid.: 14-15). In Jordan, however young 
activists are both exposed to global cultural flows, and express themselves in such conventional 
forms as patriotism and religious terms (Onodera, 2009: 59-60), indicated when some informants 
refer to Jordanian customs and cultural norms. As also pointed out during the interviews, youth 
activists in the Middle East, often living in authoritarian states, fear the possibility of being under 
surveillance of the state, which can have an impact on their social interactions in public spheres 
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(Ibid.: 45). This should be seen in the light of them at times being aggressive against the economic 
system of free market which can potentially lead to extreme cases rooted in their living conditions 
such as poverty, authoritarianism and corruption, making them feel frustrated and powerless (Bayat 
& Herrera, 2010b, 6). 
Regional Interconnectedness  
The above points lead to looking more closely into the characteristics of the Arab Spring and its 
often young actors. The protesters of the Arab Spring are portrayed by many in media and 
academics as young people representing youth revolutions. Roots for protests are claimed to lie in 
economic frustrations, in opposition to the current political rulers and an overall lack of feeling 
worth.  Scholars claim that young populations had been awoken in the context of a youth bulge 
without sufficient options for employment, since unemployment is four times as high for young 
people compared to others (Hoffman & Jamal, 2012: 170). 
 
Further frustrations among the Arab youth is manifested as dissatisfaction with the regional political 
circumstances and the way it leads to political suppression and limited options to express political 
and social opinions in public. Social media is of high value realizing the need (Hoffman & Jamal, 
2012.: 171), and 40 % of young Arabs get their news from online sources with 25 % of the total 
getting it from social media (Arab Youth Survey, 2015: 26) During the Arab Spring, youths in the 
Middle East have been presented as more liberal, less religious and more supportive of secular 
politics (Hoffman & Jamal, 2012: 171). While the youth has a vibrant sense of change, they still 
lack consistency and a specific direction in their approaches and ideas (Ibid.: 172) though Arab 
youth today are more educated and likely to protest they are less likely to vote (Ibid.: 184). 
 
Since most of the informants’ narratives have a point of departure in the Jordanian uprisings, either 
in 2010 or previously, it is relevant to mention Egypt is potentially the backbone of the Arab 
Spring. Here, demonstrations were against higher prices, labour protests were present and youths 
voluntarily involved, with social media helping them connect (Bayat, 2013: 592) which are 
elements also highlighted by the Jordanian informants and from listening to them it was confirmed 
how complaints about high prices and targeting the government for the troubles, reflected the 
practise of ‘public nagging’ (Ibid.: 588). 
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The New Arab Public 
Following from Bayat’s suggesting about categorize the new active youth after the Arab Spring, I 
was inspired by how some, contra more organized groups, manage to practise ‘collective actions’ 
exemplified as protests against higher living conditions. This is often practiced by ‘non-movements’ 
characterised as citizens practicing contentious practices to improve their lives, often including 
youth claiming their rights and challenge social control who moreover can get involved with labour 
protests (Bayat, 2013: 588-589). For the case of the Jordanian informants there was no need to 
incorporate the point about activists being ‘post-Islamist’ - a mix of Islam and democracy reflected 
in their identities (Ibid.: 592) - since only few of them mentioned religion at all. Though the overall 
characteristic of this ‘new Arab public’ as “young, educated, post-ideological and various 
marginalized who utilized expanding electronic communication such as mobile phones, Internet 
and facebook to initiate the uprisings” (Ibid: 591) was actually similar to the characteristics of the 
Jordanian activists. The term moreover includes a non-violent approach in the aim of political and 
social change (Ibid.: 599) which, however, actually was reflected in the narratives when the 
informants distanced themselves from the violent fights, while it by others were described as 
reflecting their subjectivity. 
 
In addition, an important foundation, was the existence of ‘passive networks’ consisting of people 
establishing informal contact among themselves, including noticing each other from the similar 
status and identical features despite the fact that, they may have never spoken together. Once their 
passive network or action is under common threat, individuals gather spontaneously and transform 
into an active network or collective action (Bayat, 1997: 64). Here the already organized may try to 
extend their network to include other members (Ibid.: 66), a trend demonstrated by informants who 
described trying to expand their struggles. When recalling the riots, informants stated that 
excitement was a motivation, and particularly the feeling that they were participating in an 
‘exceptional episode’. In this case, simply appearing transforms the consciousness, implying 
‘utopia’ or extraordinary moment that gives inspiration and promise a new world. However, this 
feeling could be followed by the appearance of ‘free-riders’, silent during the protests, who make 
claim and become the target of the mobilization by the already organized people (Bayat, 2013: 594-
595). This was presented in the case for Jordan, when several informants claimed that the Muslim 
Brotherhood attempted to take over the protests. The young ‘refo-lutions’ activists defined as 
revolutionary movements that are fighting for the regime to reform itself (Bayat, 2013: 599) 
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thereby, though also in relation to the acts by the regime, gained a feeling of failure related to lack 
of resources such as organizational, powerful leaders and a strategic vision that could have helped 
gaining the power back from the free-riders (Ibid.: 597). This was also expressed by several 
informants seen in the light of the need for continuous mobilization in the public as streets and 
communities (Ibid.: 600). 
 
Their - at time disappointed - expressions about not having achieved their demands refer to the two 
blind spots. The first is practical: that social and political change can be hard to achieve in reality, 
leading to a sense of powerlessness for the otherwise hopeful next step. The second temporal, 
including how that ‘fantastic moment’ creates once-in-a-lifetime experience that, because of its 
singularity, goes beyond what is possible (Schielke, 2011: 78). Here, two different theoretical points 
became valid; ‘the continuity theory of the Egyptian revolution’ stating that the events of 2011 
should not be understood as totally exceptional but as a potential return to a historical normality. 
And ‘the progress theory of the Egyptian revolution’ described as a vision of revolution, that creates 
something new and in relation to the social dynamics coming from the revolutionary energies. This 
can potentially influence the coming generation even if the political goals are not fulfilled (Ibid.: 
77). The first relates to how some informants make distance to the Arab Spring, and the second is 
especially pertinent for the motivation behind their fights. Here it is important inspiration to 
distinguish between movements that are defined by their claims and not solely from their actors, 
since one of the main points of the narratives was the importance of differentiating from other’s 
fights (Bayat, 2010a: 6) 
 
This will partly be shown via the ‘normative registers’: a certain kind of way to speak about 
particular topics including certain styles of argumentation and acting in specific ways. The choice 
of the register in which a subject is described and discussed is, in itself, a key form of normative 
debate where several key normative registers will be used. First ‘religion’ can be understood on two 
levels, as objective guidelines for a good life, and as an all-embracing metaphysical order that 
provides structure to life. Second, ‘respect’ includes a person’s social position in the community, 
appropriate behaviour and being responsible of the family. Third, ‘good character’ is based on 
sympathy, in relation to offer help and avoid conflicts. Fourth, ‘family’ includes one’s intimate 
relations to relatives and children and the acknowledgement of authorities from elders. Fifth, ‘social 
justice & rights’ establishes claims in relation to the economic and power structures in society, often 
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affected by a socialist tone including focus on issues such as corruption, privatization, nepotism, 
authoritarian rule and the lack of opportunities. Sixth, ‘love’ refers to passion and a strong 
emotional commitment excluding self-interest and complete surrender for the object of love. Lastly, 
‘success and self-realization’ relates to ensuring wealth, a place in life and to gain more experiences 
(Schielke, 2009: 167). These crucial terms highlight some of the motivations behind how Jordanian 
youths play their part in the political events reflected through their narratives and should be seen in 
light of intersubjectivity. 
Tactical Tools for Expression 
With the aim of achieving a better understanding of how significant political events are spoken of, it 
is relevant to look into how the term Arab Spring can be enhanced in either a pessimistic or positive 
sense. The more negative framing can be rooted in the harsh consequences and lack of positive 
results that followed but a certain optimism can also be sensed among the participants, related to a 
feeling of freedom and a sense that something has changed including more open communication 
(Schielke, 2011: 77). It should here be kept in mind that revolution often has little to do with the 
ideas and theoretical thoughts behind it: often, revolutions ‘just happen’ (Bayat, 2013: 600) and an 
accident can trigger a protest (Ibid.: 588). It is relevant here that several informants point out that 
they did not live up to the critical demands that they should deliver an alternative being planned out. 
 
Since most of informants had ‘political mistrust’ towards the political parties, and thus made 
distance from, certain political arenas (Bayat, 2010: 41) it is perhaps unsurprising that Arab youth 
engaged in voluntarism and organized charity work as a setting for social mobilization (Ibid.: 47) a 
trend that was the case for two informants working in the same NGO. That Jordanian politically 
active youths are critical and wished for political and transformative change by youth movements is 
relative to the amount of social control over them by the authorities (Ibid.: 29) and their potential 
for democratization and transformation therefore depend on the capacity of the authorities to their 
youth claims. In this way, young people have to think politically to become political agents (Ibid.: 
47) and are presented with the challenge that youth movements act as agents under regimes that are 
too narrow-minded to fulfil their youthful claims (Ibid.: 32). Their potential alternative appearance 
can be a challenge to the authorities (Ibid.: 31), a fact exemplified by several informants’ reports of 
how the authorities reacted towards them. 
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Here, youth bulges can have a potential impact. Bayat suggests that under such conditions social 
barriers that would previously separate rural and urban youth will vanish (Bayat, 2010, 39), a 
process especially implemented by social mass media and platforms that effect the youth to interact 
(Bayat & Herrera, 2010a: 5) and operate in a less hierarchical way (Bayat, 1997: 67). Actions 
mentioned through their narratives that related to such mobilization include ‘citizen journalism’, 
defined as something close to a ‘tactic’ for exposing ‘the real’ violence appearing during the 
protests and proving that brutality exists. This is consistent with the main foundation of citizen 
journalism which is ‘rights to have rights’ (Onodera, 2011: 11). Even though the original idea with 
social media was to entertain, the case for the Middle East is that people in authoritarian countries 
appropriate these tools to expose human rights violations, political corruption and other injustices 
committed by public authorities (Ibid.: 8). Other activities mentioned included ‘street politics’ 
referring to how a set of conflicts between a collective populace and the authorities takes place and 
expressed via the physical and social space of the streets (Bayat, 1997: 63). In continuation of that, 
‘surbmerged networks’ includes street protests, awareness-raising campaigns and online political 
critique and discussions (Onodera, 2009: 45) referring to that people rely more on personal 
networks (Ibid.: 48) confirmed throughout the analysis by the narratives. 
 
Other strategic tools can be seen as being inspired from Egyptian cases, since similar incidents have 
also taken place in Jordan. When protests were met with violent in Egypt, a face of a young political 
activist killed in the unrest, circulated with the comment ‘he could be anyone of us’ as a ‘counter-
narrative’ (Onodera, 2011: 11), another is the popular outburst ‘raise your head high, you’re an 
Egyptian’ which appeared as a revolutionary narrative for the downfall of the regime and an uphold 
moral (Ibid.: 15). Though initiated by the state, a similar incident occurred in Jordan when the 
young pilot was killed by IS, and a picture of him came out publicly encouraging the Jordanians to 
be proud of him. Both Schielke and Onodera acknowledge the role of the youth in the 2011 riots, in 
creating social dynamics that might affect the coming generations (Schielke, 2011: 4) by pointing 
out, that despite not necessarily contributing with outstanding results, young pro-democratic 
activists have played their part in initiating protests and raising awareness of police violence, 
political corruption and social injustice (Onodera, 2011: 2). These points are relevant for the 
Jordanian uprisings since they reflect the similarities - or lack of – with parallel struggles, while the 
following chapter will suitably highlight background for their fights. 
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Historical Background 
In the aim of gaining more understanding of the roots for the Jordanian uprisings and the contextual 
fundament for the informants’ fights, the following chapter will provide with background and more 
insights about Jordan. By pointing out cultural differences, economical changes and other political 
decisions made throughout the years, the purpose is to contribute with a clearer picture of Jordan 
and the power structures involved also referred to by the informants. 
Diversity Within 
After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Transjordan was established in 1921 under British mandate 
with the Hashemite family in charge who originated from the Hejaz area. With independency in 
1946 the transformation included the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan with Abdullah I as its leader 
(Ryan, 2011a: 566). The Hashemite family has ruled the kingdom ever since and is currently under 
the authorization of King Abdullah II who took over the throne in 1999 (Valbjørn, 2003: 163). 
 
As mentioned, one of the main threats towards the regime during the Jordanian uprisings was the 
presence of both Jordanian and Palestinian protesters that are often portrayed as opponents, which 
will be elaborated. Jordan is known for being split between groups; the majority consisting of Sunni 
Muslim opposite a minority of Christian and Druze, though more significant disagreements take 
place within tribes and clans that have played a big part in Jordanian politics since the creation of 
the kingdom which also have a big influence on the Jordanian identity. But the main identity split in 
the population is between the East Bank Jordanians with origins near Jordan River and Palestinian- 
Jordanian which some claim actually being the biggest population in the country. The divide is 
especially clear between the sectors, where the East Bank Jordanians are dominating the public one 
since the security forces historically were recruited among Bedouin tribes, and the Palestinians 
taking up a lot of the private sector. The Jordanian community is also influenced by the separation 
between rich and poor with the groups blaming each other for being wealthier and the Palestinians 
complaining about not having any political power (Ryan, 2011a: 565-568) which is rooted in 
historical explanation. Early after the creation of the country, Abdullah I concurred the West Bank 
during the Israeli-Arab war from 1948 (Valbjørn, 2003: 162). The population increased from 
citizenship to Palestinian refugees (Ryan, 2011a: 566). After the Arab-Israeli war in 1967 and the 
loss of the West Bank, fights over who to represent the Palestinians resulted in the open conflict 
‘Black September’ from 1970-1971 between the Hashemite rulers and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) with the consequence of PLO being expelled from Jordan (Valbjørn, 2003: 
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163). As a consequence of Israel using the ‘Jordan is Palestine’ rhetoric with the wish of 
transferring the Palestinians, King Hussein refrained from any demands of the West Bank in 1988 
followed up by the peace agreement with Israel in 1994 (Ibid.: 165). 
The Agenda of Privatization 
Since most of the informants mentioned one of the main themes during the Jordanian uprisings to 
be financial injustice it is crucial to understand the economical situation for the past half century as 
a fundamental root cause. During the 1970s and 1980s Jordan as many other countries in the region, 
faced economic crisis and was forced to take International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans as well as 
adopting structural adjustment policies including reduced public expenditures, a liberal trade regime 
and more privatization. Several social groups struggled to fit into these new adjustments and ended 
up protesting in 1989 where especially unemployment was put on the agenda which made the 
regime promise political changes (Albrecht, 2010: 36-37). Political parties were allowed and more 
freedom of speech was released which led to the first parliamentary election in 1993 after more than 
forty years (Bank & Valbjørn, 2010: 309-310). Shortly after, King Abdullah II took over and since 
his approach of leadership was criticized by several informants, as their main course of protesting, it 
will be important to account for his main concerns; economics; internal security; and foreign policy. 
 
First is reflected in the King’s statements about Jordan’s economy as a main priority which is both 
claimed to be reasoned in the wish for a strengthened international reputation for Jordan and also 
for making the population legitimatize the neoliberal discourse for modernization (Bank & 
Schlumberger, 2004: 50). Within the inclusion of global economy can be mentioned crucial 
economic reforms as the free trade agreement with the USA, economic policies via agreements with 
IMF and member of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative (Ibid: 50). This made the EU its 
largest trading partner also providing financial support in exchange for pressuring Jordan to 
implement more good governance and human rights. These good relations also tie Jordan to several 
unpopular American policies in the region (Ryan, 2014: 147) which was especially expressed by 
several informants. 
 
Second reflecting one of the main concerns behind the struggles, being King Abdullah II’s 
modernization approach as a strategy of control to depoliticize public debate and expectations about 
democratization, by stating that democracy will follow after socioeconomic changes also helping to 
justify the absence of more concrete political reforms. Though this soft ‘survival strategy’ was put 
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aside after 9/11 for a more direct repressive approach as for example postponing elections reasoned 
by unstable regional situations. Since then, more than one hundred regulations have been 
implemented in relation to ‘state security’ as for instance restricting freedom of media and 
association. These two kinds of approaches were crucial for several of the informants to mention in 
critical terms, showing that they were aware of the political moves by the King. 
  
Third being how Jordan’s military and economic weaknesses and its geographical location next to 
unstable Israel/Palestine and Iraq, demands a search for constant balance (Bank & Schlumberger, 
2004: 53) whereby the argument about security was by several informants accused as being an 
excuse for minimizing democratic conditions. The need for security can especially be seen in the 
light of the Al-Qaeda terror attack in Amman in 2005 where more than 60 people were killed by 
suicide bombers in three hotels (Ryan, 2014: 153) And moreover the influx of Iraqi refugees since 
2003 (Valbjørn, 2003: 168) and the numerous Syrian refugees since 2011 (Ryan, 2014: 144) can 
potentially create fear for more internal divides. Overall a lack of democratic results and continuous 
observations of harsh approaches towards protesters and journalists led to wonders whether King 
Abdullah II truly believes in a more influential parliament or it is ‘façade democracy’? (Valbjørn, 
2003: 174). This question is a main point of criticism by the informants, which will be elaborated 
on with the following attempt to define the regime. 
Defining Jordan & its Rule 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is formally defined as a constitutional monarchy with King 
Abdullah II being the head of state and the head of executive (Cavatorta & Durac, 2011: 79). But it 
is argued that Jordan is rather a monarchy with a parliament and a constitution, since a 
constitutional monarchy more specifically would have contained limited power to the King and 
more to the elected in the parliament including a completely independent judiciary. Because of 
Jordan’s shift between times of repression and others with more receptiveness, it is therefore argued 
to be a liberalizing autocracy including a moderate allowance of political reforms but rather for a 
protection of the power than transformation of the system (Ryan, 2011b: 368). This also goes for 
having structural features and tactical decisions in relation to financial support from abroad without 
serious pressures by the Western donors for democratic reforms (Albrecht, 2010: 34-35). One of the 
main differences that does not make the Jordanian system fully authoritarian is that the media is 
relatively free and several civil society organizations are allowed to operate (Ibid.: 38). Regardless 
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of this, the informants mentioned several harsh consequences for them speaking up, related to the so 
far untouchable power structures in Jordan. 
 
In relation to the different descriptions of the Jordanian power structures mentioned by most 
informants as cause for their fights, they are highly aware that the king remains with the power. Not 
only is he the ultimate source of power and legitimacy (Bank & Schlumberger, 2004: 35) but 
Abdullah II is also the commander-in-chief of the armed forces having the power to declare war 
(Clark, 2013: 161) as for example seen with the agreement to participate in the coalition against IS. 
The King’s function includes dictating the main policies that the government follows, appointing 
the Prime Minister (Cavatorta & Durac, 2011: 79) and moreover the Upper House members versus 
the Lower House being directly elected members which in total represent the Jordanian bicameral 
parliament (Bank & Schlumberger, 2004: 37). King Abdullah II choices often fall on 
representatives from the Jordanian tribes over the ones with Palestinian descent (Albrecht, 2010: 
121) as a part of how the pattern of elite circulation is present (Bank & Schlumberger, 2004: 40). 
Even though, the Lower House with its position to debate and endorse legislation and criticize 
government decisions, it is almost impossible to oppose royal decisions and policies which makes 
the Lower House of less political relevance (Ibid.: 38). The Jordanian parliament is in that way 
more of an arena for services instead of policies (Albrecht, 2010: 126). 
Settings for Political Opposition 
This inequality is also reflected in the society where having real influence is a matter of individual 
personality such as family status, contact to decision-makers and geographical background such as 
being either East-Jordanian or Palestinian-Jordanian. Simply put that, ‘wasta’, being neo-
patrimonial polities, plays a big part (Bank & Schlumberger, 2004: 38) and this was also expressed 
during interviews as an obstacle for better life. As mentioned, some of the main demands during the 
Jordanian uprisings were concerned about the electoral system, and even though the liberation 
process from 1989 has including several changes in the election system being from a ‘block vote’ 
system where people had as many votes as there are seats in a given district (Ryan, 2011b: 375) to 
the new political parties law issued in 1993, still ruling today, the critics do not stop. As highly 
criticized by several informants, it consists of a one-person-one-vote system that forces voters to 
choose between candidates based on tribes or ideological ones. The electoral districts are 
gerrymandered for the benefit of rural areas, with tribes loyal to the King, meaning that the urban 
areas are in that way discriminated where political parties are concentrated. Consequently, the law 
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limits the candidates from political parties to reach parliament (Albrecht, 2010: 118) and fulfills the 
authorities’ hope for people to prioritize family ties over ideological ones which actually reduced 
the representation of Islamists and leftists in the political system (Ryan, 2011b: 376). 
 
Since the Muslim Brotherhood was mentioned as playing a part in the Jordanian uprisings, a brief 
introduction to the political scene among the Jordanian parties will be presented here. It includes the 
historical relationship between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood that has been legally 
operating in Jordan since 1945 because of strategic reasons such as them being representatives for 
the Palestinians. Their political wing Islamic Action Front has several times marked themselves 
significantly in relation to elections, either by taken parliamentary seats or boycotting. The leftist 
opposition is historically known for mobilizing in the streets but is now considered as small and 
weak (Albrecht, 2010: 122-123).  Most of the Jordanian opposition consists of political parties that 
were legalized in 1991 after more than 30 years and the parties have managed to work more 
together across political lines in the aim for stronger outcomes (Ryan, 2011b: 373-374). Even 
though, the historical success for the regime to manipulate the executive and legislative powers in 
the hands of the King and his cabinet is the root of its survival. In addition, help is found in strategic 
relation to the tribes and weakening of the opposition via ‘politics of distraction’ (Clark, 2013: 161) 
which will be elaborated later on in the theoretical chapter about authoritarian regimes. 
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Methodological Framework 
The following chapter consists of a presentation of the methodological approach along with 
reflections of field-based data collection. The inspiration for the framework is from the 
anthropologist Kirsten Hastrup (2003) and her conceptions around studying cultures. Inspiration 
was also found via the anthropologist Cecilie Rubow (2003) and the psychologist Steiner Kvale and 
his companion Svend Brinkmann (2008) with suggestions how to enter the field and collect data. 
Underlying Strategic Approach 
My aim was to present the various narratives of Jordan and its significant political incidents during 
the past five years namely; the Arab Spring; demands for reform and democratization; fear of 
regional spillovers with increased radicalization; and the death of the Jordanian pilot Muath al-
Kasasbeh. The thesis demonstrates a specific interest of looking into what I saw as misconceptions 
between the dominant narratives and the reality in Jordan. I am aware of how this reflects certain 
solidarity with giving space to the societal voices. I acknowledge the point that it can be difficult to 
describe other worlds since the anthropologist both has to avoid a sentimental view of the field 
whilst also avoiding taking a clinical distance where it is hard to feel what is being described and in 
that way not experiencing the authentic (Hastrup, 2003a: 28). This underlines the crucial 
importance of letting narratives be the framework thereto I decided to bring in the Royal Narrative 
by Jordan’s royal leader King Abdullah II and the narratives by politically active youths. 
 
The main purpose of bringing in the King was to portray his statements and opinions for setting the 
stage where the young informants and their views on the various political topics can play out, since 
these are what most of them criticize. This tension creates an interesting potential fight over the 
narrative of Jordan. Inevitably it was not possible to get in direct contact with King Abdullah II, 
however the narratives presented by him are secondary empirical data obtained through his official 
website, a public source with the aim of affecting the political process in Jordan3. From the different 
documents I have chosen interviews and speeches since those come close to questions I myself had 
in mind, structured out from the aforementioned main events in Jordan during the last five years. 
The purpose of the analysis of the Royal Narrative is not to deliver an overly in-depth analysis but 
will also be backed up by Osama, another elitist informant that I managed to get in contact with. He 
represents the official work with Jordanian youth via the program of the organization. 
 
                                                 
3
 http://kingabdullah.jo/ 
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With the aim of gathering young voices to inform my research I decided to conduct ethnographical 
fieldwork defined as a long-term scientific stay in the area of interest where the approach to collect 
anthropological knowledge is intensified including active participation in the field (Hastrup, 2003a: 
12-13). The process resulted in the large amount of data attached as Appendices including a listed 
overview of the informants. From already having insights about Jordan and its youth it was of high 
importance to be selective when deciding the informants (Hastrup, 2003b: 400). The selective 
attention for this thesis was primarily on the importance of how the different events set the 
timeframe of the social field (Hastrup, 2003a: 16) beginning in 2010 during the main riots in 
Jordan, until mid 2015 where the thesis fieldwork ended after an intense period of five months. 
Moreover the geographical basis for the fieldwork defined as the anthropologist being placed within 
the community being observed (Ibid.: 10) was adjusted in relation to how the methodology will 
always bend towards the direction of the material, constantly being under creation because of the 
conversion of the community and the specific knowledge and interest the anthropologist has 
(Hastrup, 2003b: 399). This was especially seen when my first strategy was to compare narratives 
by youth from Amman with those from youth from residing in the southern cities of Karak and 
Tafileh. Although my previous experience with academic texts stated these as the cities were at the 
heart of the Jordanian uprisings, the more talks I had with youth in Amman presented a clearer 
picture of the geographical importance. The youth I spoke to pointed towards the small suburb 
Dibarn as being the place where everything started in 2006, confirming that anthropology is 
breaking with the usual top-down causality (Hastrup, 2003a: 24). 
 
It was therefore of high importance to follow the inspiration from Rubow about actively selecting 
the informants while being in the field with the aim of gaining wide variation (Rubow, 2003: 231). 
For that reason I made use of ‘the snowball approach’ as a starting point meaning that I depended 
on my network to put me in contact with informants. In order to deliver a better picture of what 
actually happened during the Jordanian uprisings it was necessary to establish contact with people 
from Dibarn. I therefore decided to make use of a gatekeeper which moreover was a big help with 
translating during the interviews since the Arabic language was a barrier. I trusted to let that person 
be a connection I had known for years and him having a good understanding of my thesis. He is 23-
years old and raised in Amman. We have known each other from the NGO I was interning in where 
he works with empowering youth. I was aware that his recommendations would possibly be 
reflecting his own political sympathy since the people he could access were naturally a part of his 
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network, being the activists affiliated with Dibarn, but despite having participated in few 
demonstrations he has never been affiliated with any political parties or ideology. 
 
Another selective approach was about the young informants which were partly determined by my 
already established network rooted in the potential change in political awareness that I had sensed. 
This reflects the interest for the chosen informants being youth that are political active in society 
with opinions about the significant political events or active roles in the Jordanian uprisings. I am 
therefore aware that the range of young informants mostly represents educated, English-speaking 
activists that claim to have awareness about societal issues which is not the average profile of the 
Jordanian youth. Intentionally knowing that that was my main framework I then decided to let the 
conduction of interviews be very open and allow their answers about the various political incidents 
to shape the focus of main importance, which pointed towards the Arab Spring. This was concretely 
done with inspiration from Rubow stating that partly structured interviews can be used as 
participatory observation (Rubow, 2003: 227) allowing an open sphere for observing their reactions 
and statements which reflected their political awareness and beings as active youths. 
 
Related to this is how speaking not only represents the world but relates to it in a reflective way 
(Hastrup, 2003b: 412) linked to intersubjectivity defined as the acknowledgement of the mutual 
attention between various actors and events that makes the fundament for the individual self-
understanding. These are very valid points in relation to narratives and how the informants would 
like to represent themselves (Hastrup, 2003a: 10) as activists. In that way I made use of the 
anthropological intention to localize the conceptions that united the facts, experiences, actions and 
narratives between each other plus having a certain aim of predictability on the social field even 
though it is within the field where the unpredictable will appear (Hastrup, 2003b: 403). The 
predictable was that they would have opinions about the selected topics because of the criteria 
listed, but the unpredictable was how the narratives about the Jordanian uprisings differentiated 
from each informant. This reflects the focus of anthropology as to observe a person as a part of a 
social community (Hastrup, 2003b, 399) in this case being from different active groups in society. 
Fieldwork & Informants 
Due to the aforementioned reasons I therefore decided to make fieldwork with active youths from 
the capital Amman and the suburb Dibarn. I started the fieldwork with a visit to Dibarn on Labour 
Day 2015 where they traditionally had a gathering. The organizers of the event were the Worker’s 
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Union and The Democratic Youth Union. The first organization was established in 2006 by 40 year 
old Mustafa, a daily-paid agricultural worker from Dibarn who earned less than 4 US dollars a day 
collecting the other workers to fight for rights and better conditions. Throughout the years they 
collaborated with the ministries and prime ministers to improve their conditions. But since the 
results for change were lacking, they gathered with other unemployed young people and students to 
spark the Jordanian Social Hirak January 7, 2011 claiming fall of the system. The protests expanded 
on January 14, 2011 where Amman, Dibarn and Karak faced demonstrations having three main 
demands; against high prices, against corruption and for the fall of the Prime Minister. Despite the 
regime replacing the Prime Minister and promising better conditions for the workers, they still 
continued their protests now representing various people in society (Appendix B). Mustafa and the 
workers are affiliated with The Democratic Youth Union which has 36 year old Ali as one of the 
front persons. The Democratic Youth Union is an organization representing youth and students 
socially and politically, advocating for their rights and needs and on average it attracts 200 people 
for events. Consisting of young people under the age of 45 years old they seek to be an effective 
force of social actors and it cooperates with other protest movements including workers to become 
one combined movement. This forms part of a grand alliance representing the ‘real’ political power 
of the Jordanian people advocating against capitalism, corruption, the model of liberal democracy 
and capital-centric policies. They work for Jordan to be independent from the USA and appeal for 
power to the social forces and youth political movements, appealing the Jordanian youth to come 
under their slogan of ‘bread, freedom and social justice’ (Appendix I, p. 99). 
 
The leftist socialist vibe was undoubtedly present in the warm tent put up on the small square across 
the main mosque where elders took seats in the shade while children were running around with 
Jordanian and communist flags. That was the first time I saw Mustafa and Ali who were 
respectively pointed out to me as; “that is the guy that started hirak in Jordan and over there is our 
friend’s brother who is organizing the event today”. I felt very excited about being there especially 
when observing Mustafa’s speech led by a raised clenched fist instead of notes and Ali being 
complimented by the other organizers as ‘our son and brother’. I eagerly asked my gatekeeper to 
present me to them afterwards to conduct interviews. But he seemed hesitant and explained that 
such leftist people could potentially be dismissive against foreigners perhaps coming from 
international NGOs or newspapers, so he recommended not disturbing them that day and instead 
sending emails through contacts. I felt that I lost my strategy for connection and was frustrated at 
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the language barrier, as if I spoke Arabic I could have presented myself as a neutral academic. 
However, I naturally agreed to follow the cultural norms and be patient reflecting the point that it is 
beneficial with longer stays to explore the social communities (Hastrup, 2003b: 406). 
 
 
Private picture of Labour Day 2015 in Dibarn 
 
In relation to that I strongly followed the advice of how crucial it is to consider the settings for the 
interview itself (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2003: 167). Therefore I allowed all the informants to decide 
the location, ending up various places, first time being in the centre of Amman in one of Webdhe’s 
colourful cafes with 23 year old Fadwa. The access to her was through my previous workplace 
where she was an active Policy Advisor with profound knowledge about society and what kinds of 
conditions could be improved for youth. Through the interview I was correctly confirmed in 
information about the regime’s repression I had known previously, which verified that some of my 
knowledge actually came from my experience in the NGO world. Since then and during the other 
interviews I followed the recommendations of starting out trying to establish a sense of confidence 
between us by showing respect for their occupation and offering them the option of being 
anonymous. Naturally also giving a briefing about the aim of the talk; what kind of interests I had 
behind the research; and the technical things such as the use of a recorder (Ibid.: 149). 
 
In the meantime my gatekeeper had succeeded in getting contact to Ali who had agreed for an 
interview in my home under a safe setting as long as he would be served snacks and a cold beer. My 
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aim with the interview was to get more insights about the Social Hirak and get in contact with an 
activist from the streets. This was the first out of three interviews where I used the gatekeeper as a 
personal connection for translating which worked successfully in relation to understand the 
narrative reflecting the positive sides from such connections but moreover also the challenging 
aspects (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2003: 164-165). As when he added his own comments rather than 
simply translating word by word which actually highlights how the theme of the thesis includes 
several relevant topics that the Jordanian youths like to share their opinions about.  
 
Meanwhile I had come across an interesting article written by Aisha, a 25 year old journalist stating 
that the death of the pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh should not be an excuse to increase military attacks 
and war4. From reading her other online articles and her blog she appeared to me as very debatable 
about socio-political issues and I wanted to know more about how activism is expressed via writing. 
I found out that she was affiliated with 7iber which is a media organization that produces an online 
magazine, focusing on human rights and access to information, moreover functioning as a social 
hub for related trainings and debates so people can be free to ‘share their own narratives’5. So after 
having emailed Aisha, we made a Skype interview since she was based in New York. The snowball 
approach was once again fruitful when she recommended me to talk to Hadia and Osama that she 
put me in contact with. Aisha had described Hadia as a 27 year old activist that was very political 
and had faced harsh consequences for not holding herself back from the streets, which was suitable 
considering I was searching for a person that was active during the Jordanian uprisings. I arrived to 
Hadia’s home in Salt outside Amman and was welcomed by this laidback woman though with a 
tough attitude. Her home was traditional with big couches and pictures with Arabic writings but 
also reflected paintings with suppressed workers and the bookshelves boomed with writers such as 
Edward Said, Naomi Klein and Michael Moore. She showed her hospitality by serving a big piece 
of cake but was also relaxed enough to breast-feed her newborn baby while keeping the eye contact 
with me telling how she got beaten up in the protests. 
 
Shortly after, I made the interview with Thaer whom I have known since my first arrival in Jordan, 
also working together in the same NGO. He has always shared his political opinions against Israel 
and pro Pan-Arabism statements so I found it interesting to interview a 25 year old person who not 
only saw himself as being politically aware but moreover enlightened with the right ideological 
                                                 
4
 Attached as Appendix K 
5
 https://www.facebook.com/7iber/info/?tab=page_info Official 7iber page, Found October 2015 
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directions. We met at his office nearly being our common area which I think moreover contributed 
to his openness since it was under safe settings. The contact to 54 year old Osama via Aisha 
honestly strayed from my target group of active young people but I found it interesting to get access 
to an elitist dealing with youth. He had previously been in charge of a youth development program 
for King Abdullah II Fund for Development and still has close royal ties. The change of setting 
appeared clearly to me when arriving to his office on the top of the bank he was the chairman of 
where I was welcomed by a stylish secretary in fancy surroundings. The time for me was appointed 
for half an hour compared to the other interviews lasting for hours, which reflected that though it 
was fruitful to hear his views upon youth and development I never really got in-depth about his 
perspectives on the Arab Spring or potential repression, which honestly was also rooted in feeling a 
bit intimidated by the highbrow cultural settings. Nevertheless, I sensed how that helped to create a 
comfortable atmosphere for him to present a reproduction of aspects from the royal narrative. 
 
In the meantime I was still struggling to arrange the interview with Mustafa in Dibarn. My strategy 
was to gain more information about the background for the Social Hirak and moreover perhaps use 
him as an entrance to fieldwork in Dibarn. My friend, Ali’s brother, had promised to put me in 
contact with Mustafa and would moreover assist as driver and translator. But his continuous 
postponing of the meeting created certain irritations between us confirming how different 
understandings of ‘yes’ for appointments can have several meanings and the researcher having to 
get used to new circumstances in other cultures (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2003: 164-165). It finally 
came out as non-complicated when Mustafa replied that I was “welcome anytime” when my 
gatekeeper got in contact with him via Facebook. Despite the delay making me accept that more 
fieldwork and interviews in Dibarn would not be possible it was decided to hold the interview in 
Mustafa’s humble home with a stationary computer and a picture of Saddam Hussein, us sitting on 
the traditional mattresses on the floor and despite Ramadan being served various drinks by his 
children that laughed and looked away every time I smiled at them. Though that could reflect them 
not being used to foreigners, Mustafa obviously was, telling the story of Jordanian riots for two and 
a half hours that he literally knew by heart before I could ask a single question reflecting that the 
anthropologist never speaks first but listens to what kinds of questions it makes sense to ask 
(Hastrup, 2003b: 416). 
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Private picture of Mustafa’s humble home 
 
Anthropological Techniques 
Overall seven interviews took place during the fieldwork showing the tendency of various kinds of 
political active youth which has contributed to gain insights about this fragile category and the 
narratives encircling it. To get more ethnographically in-depth, observations and less formal talks in 
the field has been valid in the aim of studying the youths’ interactions with the surroundings (Kvale 
& Brinkmann, 2003: 136) also noted down in a field diary to add collected data. 
 
Because of the fact that the political topics were very personal to the informants and were at times 
shaping their whole life, is has been of high value to structure the interviews more as conversations. 
The approach was inspired by partly structured interviews and was a big help to let the informants 
point towards the effects of the significant events. It is almost defined as a normal conversation at 
the same time being the fundament for the following critical analysis by enhancing conflicts and 
agreements in the every day practice, while I contributed with a way of participating (Rubow, 2003: 
243). I was concretely inspired by the ‘fieldworker-informant’ point where other relations can 
appear during an interview as for example the interviewer including private experiences (Ibid.: 239) 
expressed by how I at times revealed some personal understandings of Jordan to create more 
community. This resulted in some revealing about their connections to the authorities that they 
pointed out was normally not something to share. This fulfilled my intention of how an interview 
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can be more than just a source for information since people can up for more than just the specific 
topics and share their thoughts and feelings about it in the aftermath (Ibid.: 238). This being a result 
of inspiration from the narrative interview approach giving the informants more freedom and time 
to tell their stories. Including that the topic stretches above the person’s story and covers a common 
history which means the interviewee is an informant who registers the story of the local community 
(Kvale & Brinkmann, 2003: 175-176). 
 
In that way, the informants both contributed with insights about the Jordanian society and their own 
personal experiences and opinions being of special benefit since the informants had several versions 
of what happened during the Jordanian uprisings, which could be used to analyze more precisely the 
reflection of intersubjectivity and moreover getting closer to the narratives about Jordan. Here I was 
also inspired by the semi-structured life-world interview aiming to collect descriptions of the 
interviewed person’s world with the intention to interpret the meaning of the described phenomenon 
so the interviewer is learning in the process (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2003: 144) In that way, the 
ethnographical interview is not very different to a narrative but is more focused than private talks 
because the conversation is an agreed meeting (Rubow, 2003: 235). This flexible approach is also 
related to the interview guide being determined by the more knowledge about the topics the 
researcher will gain (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2008: 133) which was also the case for this process since 
narrative by narrative revealed new insights about the Jordanian uprisings. In that way the interview 
guide helped as a combination of structure and flexibility where the aim was to find answers for 
most of the questions but they were intentionally formulated so new directions could open up. This 
leans towards the point that the more spontaneous the procedure for an interview is, the bigger is the 
changes of gaining unexpected answers (Ibid.: 151). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 38 
Theoretical Framework 
The following chapter will provide insights about the theoretical framework of narratives and power 
in relation to authoritarian rule, which Jordan is partly described as. With a focus on narratives it is 
crucial to include inspiration from the New Zealander anthropologist Michael Jackson (2002) and 
particularly his theory of how narrative is a coping strategy to gain a sense of agency. Given that 
most of the informants claim that the powerful and oppressive nature of the Jordanian regime is the 
root of their fights, it will be relevant to incorporate theoretical perspectives around power. For this 
thesis it will be represented by one of the leading operator of power, the French philosopher Michel 
Foucault (1978, 1980, 1982, 2000 & 2001), since a particularly focus on how power is everywhere 
is crucial for the understanding of intersubjectivity. Lastly a theoretical focus on authoritarianism 
and repressive means will follow to provide insight of the relation between the regime and activists. 
The Importance of Narrative 
With the strategic aim of letting the different narratives in society be highlighted, the inspiration 
from theory about narrative was of crucial importance. It was most specifically used for the analysis 
of the ethnographic fieldwork amongst the youth about how events during the past five years could 
potentially have affected the category of being an activist in Jordan. This is consistent with the 
overall anthropological approach of understanding people through their storytelling. 
 
One of the main reasons behind the importance to focus on intersubjectivity through this thesis is 
the issue of perceiving that a human life is essentially as individual life. Instead, stories are a result 
of ongoing dialogue and redaction within the fields of intersubjectivity, viewed as how storytelling 
is creations of a social relation between self and others. This is among other reasons rooted in how 
lives are depicted in inevitably social, political and historical affairs. Specifically will be shown that 
narratives are under transformation when being retold and reconstructed in relation to the 
intersubjectivity (Jackson, 2002: 22-23). 
 
Here, the human need to feel rooted as a social factor, and the feeling of belonging contributing to 
the sense of fitting with a wider field of being, links to the person’s participation in a community 
with others. In that way, the relation between micro and macro, and even between the visible and 
invisible take place (Jackson, 2002: 12). This was highlighted throughout the analysis in how the 
informants’ narratives show a need to be part of something bigger, overall being the development of 
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Jordan in corporation with others, but in different ways. Inspired by that, interactions individuals 
have with others make everyone both an actor and acted upon, a ‘who’ and a ‘what’, a subject who 
actively participates in the making of one’s world and one subjected to actions by others and 
uncontrolled circumstances. This will be expressed in the analysis that will be divided into the 
active and more passive approaches. This intersubjective life in that way consists of this ongoing 
struggle to negotiate one’s being and subjectivation. Additional to this, how abstract ideas and 
ideals can become parts of the subject (Ibid: 12-13). For this case of Jordanian youth how regional 
chaotic circumstances reflecting how the abstract level of relations between the global and local 
events appear as cultural encounters effecting the activists and political awareness. 
 
Moreover was noticed how the informants at times described the regime in harsh ways, related to 
the point that enemies may be portrayed as subhuman without moral. This is in the aim of achieving 
some sense of security and viability since the social and physical circumstances affect the being of 
an individual in an either reduced or flourishing way leading to a strategic struggle to sustain 
oneself as a subject. This seen in relation to how being is thus not a belonging but a becoming 
(Jackson, 2002: 13) where I will argue how this is partly the case for some of the informants but 
that belonging also plays a big part for others. 
 
Jackson points out that the ‘existential imperative’ is the fundament for strategies to understand the 
crossings between the informants and their interactions with the world around them. The existential 
imperative, including the need for human beings to have choices and understanding, in order to 
have control over their own lives, is defined as a ‘sense of agency’. This includes a focus on the 
person’s imagination of belonging to something bigger than oneself, where his or her words and 
actions matter and can make a difference. Here the important point is not about whether human 
freedom of action actually exists but whether people imagine having it since the idea of freedom 
can be seen as a motivation for the informants and their struggles. This will especially be shown in 
how informants use the strategies behind storytelling, including transforming private into public, 
and the more existential approach that sees storytelling as a human strategy for maintaining a sense 
of agency in confrontation with disempowering circumstances (Jackson, 2002: 14-15). In that way, 
by telling their narratives, it will be shown how it enabled the informants to regain some footing 
over the events surrounding them and in that way recreated faith in the world. In this context, 
storytelling is viewed as a coping strategy where words are manipulated to change one’s experience 
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of the world meaning that speech is a supplement to action rather than a replacement, often caused 
by a crisis (Ibid: 17-18). 
 
This should be seen in relation to how people can feel they are actively participating via storytelling 
in an otherwise oppressive world, by reconstructing events they have experienced. This can change 
our experience of the events by either confirming the otherness we had in mind or making us 
question what we have been taking for granted in a more critical way (Jackson, 2002: 25). 
Therefore all stories are grounded in the existential imperatives and the analytical focus must be on 
the lived patterning of intersubjective life since this highlights the transformation whereto the 
existential imperative that makes people transform the world in a more bearable way is the energy 
that motivates people to feel that they play a part in their lives. In that way, the dialectic between 
people only has meaning in relation to intersubjectivity, defined as the relation to the dynamic 
interplay of self and not-self (Ibid.: 29-30) as also reflected in the activists’ narratives. 
 
Since most of the informants described Jordan as a suppressive setting we should note that under 
authoritarian regimes, people’s ability to speak and act openly is violated which can make 
storytelling evanescent (Jackson, 2002: 34). This will be shown throughout the analysis the way 
several informants highlighted marginalization as an issue in Jordanian society. This reflects the 
point that marginalization is a result of economic divide between those who have and those who do 
not have and often leads to existential crisis for the ones that feel powerless. Here storytelling can 
be seen as a mediator between private and public spheres where the suppressed can gain some sense 
of control of their lives and a feeling of collective belonging. The storytelling by the informants 
therefore gives some crucial insights into the struggles they are facing in trying to defeat the 
suppressing between two counterpoints; first focusing on the self and second focused on not-self of 
all considered foreign to oneself (Ibid: 35). This leads to the final comment that life is a road and in 
travelling it we both follow the tracks of those who have gone before and leave traces of ourselves 
which become (Ibid.: 32) which will be important to have in the back of the mind in the analysis to 
gain more insights about what happened during the Jordanian uprisings. 
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Power is Everywhere 
Since all the young informants claim the oppressive nature of the Jordanian regime as the root for 
their fight respectively, it was informative to frame the analysis theoretical perspectives around 
power represented by Foucault. In the aim of having an open approach to the outcomes of the 
analysis it was inspiring to include the overall point about that power can be understood as 
ubiquitous since it comes from everywhere. It is produced from one moment to the next and is in 
that way permanent, self-producing and repeating itself (Foucault, 1978: 93). Since the informants’ 
expressions were in relation to the power structures in Jordanian society it was valid for the analysis 
to keep in mind that power must be seen as the profusion of power structures that are immanent in 
the sphere in which they operate meaning that it is the moving foundation of power structures that 
constantly creates power conditions. Power should not be understood as institutions, sets of rules or 
any kind of system by domination conducted of one group over another: these are just some forms 
power can take (Ibid.: 92-93). 
 
When most of the activists criticized King Abdullah II and authorities, specially charging them with 
suppressing them, they also revealed a certain interest in shaping the agenda on the political scene. 
This reflected the widespread conception of power as negative, a force defined by its repressive 
effects. If repression is seen as the main concept of power, a solely juridical conception of power 
dominates, identified with a law that says “no” and behaving predominately as the force of 
prohibition. Instead, power should be thought of as a productive network that runs through the 
whole social body, not an entity that weighs on people as a negative force, but one that produces 
things, forms knowledge and produces discourses (Foucault, 1980: 119). This was exemplified 
when several informants felt enlightened by their fights and had a need to inform others. It was in 
that way confirmed that power would never be tolerated if people did not get a part of freedom and 
therefore power would never be accepted if it was consistently cynical (Foucault, 1978: 86). 
 
Of Foucault’s different propositions in relation to power it was especially relevant for the study of 
narratives that power must be analyzed in its practise. The function of power is rooted in countless 
points in the interaction of relations, as seen in the Jordanian uprisings, where their different parts 
and demands can be seen as a result of their opponents. This is related to the other proposition that 
power structures are the effects of imbalances that appear. According to this it will be argued in the 
analysis that the uprisings were partly a result of political and socio-economical inequality. 
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Moreover the point about that no power is conducted without aims and objectives, was confirmed 
during some of the interviews where the informants stated out their political goals. I will also argue, 
however, that this point specifically in relation to Jordanian uprisings should be questioned as a 
result of other informants defending themselves societal criticisms that they do not have fixed 
alternative plans. Throughout the analysis I will argue that the foundation of the informants’ fights 
is dependent of power structures. This reflects another very relevant proposition for young 
Jordanian politically activists, that were there is power, there is resistance. Even though this 
resistance is never outside power and cannot escape reflecting the important roles it plays for 
example as the target in power structures. Since the different narratives reveal a certain diversity in 
opposition, it was confirmed that there is no specific source for all rebellions, but rather that 
multiple resistances take place such as; “resistances that are possible, necessary, improbable; 
others that are spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, or violent; still others that are 
quick to compromise, interested, or sacrificial”. In that way, the points of resistance manifest at the 
intersections of social layers and individuals without being exactly localized (Foucault, 1978: 94-
96). 
 
The analysis will thus be conducted with inspiration from some of Foucault’s methodological 
points. That the location of power should be at the extreme points, for this thesis when the various 
actors are in confrontation with each other (Foucault, 1980: 96); that power must be studied at the 
point of its intention, as what is behind the informants’ need to react, making the analysis thus an 
attempt to discover how the subjects are gradually, progressively and materially established through 
forces, energies and thoughts (Ibid.: 97); that power should be analyzed as something that functions 
in a chain and circulates, with the understanding of that individuals circulate and are at the same 
time practicing the power. In that way the informants are not only the target of power but also 
elements of its articulation (Ibid.: 98) meaning that there would not be any fight and thereto less of 
the identical elements without the power structures; that an analysis of power must start at minimal 
mechanisms with each own story and afterwards see how the power mechanisms have been 
invested by more general mechanisms and through ways of global domination (Ibid.: 99). This 
reflects the important relevance of using narratives as a fundamental approach for understanding the 
reflections of intersubjectivity. From this perspective, it can be seen as valid to begin historical 
investigations at the discrete level and to use this to illuminate on how mechanisms of power have 
been able to function (Ibid.: 100), as seen through the historical understanding of Jordan and the 
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smaller societies. By observing the techniques of power and showing how the advantages of 
political utility came from them in a given context for specific reasons, a bigger understanding of 
the effectiveness of these mechanisms as incorporated them into the social whole will appear (Ibid.: 
101). Overall Foucault concludes that researches should be focused on the nature of power should 
mainly on ways of subjection, domination and the material operators of power (Ibid.: 102) which is 
tallying with the theory of narratives. 
Power & Authoritarianism 
This section will provide more detailed perspectives of how power structures can operate in the 
kind of authoritarian regime that Jordan at times is defined as. Though Jordan has always been at 
the center of chaos in the region, it has managed to remain a stable country (Cavatorta & Durac, 
2011: 79). This can be attributed to the way regimes use a ‘divide-and-rule tactic’, through alliances 
with political groups across ideological divides agreements with social groups that otherwise could 
have been a threat to the system and its powerful position (Albrecht, 2010: 34-35). This is believed 
to be one of the main reasons why liberal authoritarian regimes are maintaining their power (Ibid.: 
38). The strategy consists of making a big split between groups, prevention the opposition standing 
together strongly enough (Ibid.: 10). In Jordan this means how secular parties have remained small 
and religious groups have emerged as better organized (Ibid.: 34-35), while the Jordanian 
secularists’ fear of the Islamists partly explains their weakness and poor spreading of ideological 
ideas (Bank & Schlumberger, 2004: 92). Moreover, the aspect of blood relations will be pointed out 
during the analysis as an important element in the mechanisms of power manifestations mostly 
highlighted through alliances build up related to tribes (Foucault, 1978: 147). The fact that this is of 
high importance in Jordan presuppose a high degree of repression from the Jordanian regime, which 
limits the potential for equality (Albrecht, 2010: 18). 
 
One characteristic of an authoritarian regime is ‘exclusive responsiveness’: the idea that a certain 
support from the society is needed for any political regime to survive. This means that crucial 
elements in society cannot be totally ignored and a certain access to the political arena must 
therefore be allowed (Albrecht, 2010: 8-10). The pressure from the 1980s and 1990s that led to 
liberalizing reforms in Jordan (Cavatorta & Durac, 2011: 79) should be seen in the light of the 
strategy to meet some of the oppositional or societal groups’ key demands – a strategy that, from 
some understandings, neutralizes them politically (Albrecht, 2010: 35). It will therefore later on be 
argued that the Jordanian regime is claimed to make use of another characteristic: that of having 
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‘adaptive capacities’ and a high degree of flexibility for changing circumstances and opportunities. 
This is necessary for the regime to remain in power and can be seen in the regulations of elections 
and parliaments (Ibid.: 8-10). In that way the regimes receive political support from social groups 
that potentially could be a threat in return, for example as procedural concessions such as law 
regulations, which means that the given group can influence the policy decisions that affect their 
interests (Ibid.: 44). In relation to this, it will be shown how some informants claim to have made 
changes through dialogue with the regime. Though overall the negotiations between regimes and 
groups from the opposition over meeting the political demands is based on the strategy to limit their 
ability to press for further political changes, they may also lower their desire for fully entering the 
political arena (Ibid.: 41) since more repressive approaches are also used. 
 
Here, it was valid to include the definition of repression as being “condemned to prohibition, 
nonexistence, and silence” (Foucault, 1978: 6-7) where being repressed consists of wrongly being 
silenced, which makes it hard and dangerous to speak up (Ibid.: 34-35). As will be shown 
throughout the analysis, when a repressed term is then mentioned a certain awareness of being 
rebellious is implied, along with a passion for the contribution to change that is believed to be acted 
out. This comes from the eagerness to express repressed terms with the aim of speaking up against 
the powers to link together knowledge and liberation. But confirming the repression is to put light 
on the fear that prevents people putting revolution and happiness together side by side (Ibid.: 6-7), 
an idea several times reflected during interviews where the fear of speaking up was mentioned. 
Here, the informants’ several references to the cultural domains reflect the ‘repressive hypothesis’: 
that when a term is repressed it is verified to a general level, and must be explained as being 
historically manifested and so steadily rooted that it would be hard to unchain it or that it would at 
least take a long time before a term would be unrepressed (Ibid.: 9-10). The repressive hypothesis 
functions through significant central mechanism containing all kinds of negative elements such as 
prohibitions and censorships (Ibid.: 12), reflected in how negatively informants talked about 
suppressed political topics. This includes where and when it is not possible to talk about terms, and 
under which conditions (Ibid.: 17-18). 
 
Here, whoever is speaking about the term is delimitated by certain external and internal procedures 
which were also reflected throughout the narratives. Of the external procedures of exclusion in a 
society, prohibition is the most common which includes not having the right to say everything, 
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everywhere. There are three kinds of prohibition; the taboo around the item; the ritual for the event; 
and the speaking subject’s exclusive and privileged right (Foucault, 2001: 43). The narratives not 
only revealed that it is for example rooted in the society not to talk badly about the King, but also 
showed, from some of the informants actually doing that, that the above-mentioned point about 
awareness of being rebellious was revealed. Of the internal procedures of exclusion the comment 
coming from the cultural system, being certain terms that retold so the discourse is kept alive (Ibid.: 
50-53), is reflected throughout the interviews how cultural norms and reputation is of importance 
for the Jordanian society. In addition to that, the culture of ‘the good old days’ including a warm 
social body can be expressed as taken away by capitalism and industrialization (Foucault, 2000: 
368). Moreover, Foucault mentions how another control of the speaker related to how the person is 
only allowed access to the order of discourse if they fulfil certain demands or from the beginning 
seem suitable living up to these (Foucault, 2001: 59), which will be reflected in the analysis and 
critically pointed out in the discussion. 
 
Here it is relevant to bring in the definition of critique as looking into what type of assumptions of 
established familiar notions and ways of thinking are accepted, in the context of the informants not 
only practicing criticism but also attempting to enlighten others and in that way aiming for change. 
Thought is something that, despite it is being hidden, always drives everyday behaviours. The 
consistence of criticism is to uncover that thought and try to change it; showing that things are not 
as obvious as many think and making sure that it is no longer taken for granted. In that way, 
criticism is inevitable for any transformation, since a transformation that stays in the same thought 
would only be superficial. At the same time, transformation becomes very urgent and possible as 
soon as people begin to have difficulty in thinking things the way they have been thought. So, 
criticism and transformation are not separated, and a deep transformation can rather be 
accomplished in the atmosphere of an ongoing criticism. This reflected in the narratives expressing 
disappointment about lack of transformation. Thus by making the conflicts more visible than simply 
clashes of institutional systems and interests, a reform will necessarily be a temporary profile 
whereto if ways of thinking, which are ways of acting, have not been thoroughly adapted and will 
be assimilated by institutional ways that will always be the same (Foucault, 2000: 456-457).  
 
According to the Organization of Human Rights in Jordan, the government uses its power to scare 
the population and silence the opposition via trivial arrests, harassment and torture, while the 
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biggest problems for the country are poverty, corruption, injustice and insufficient responsibility of 
the ones in power (Cavatorta & Durac, 2011: 87) not to forget the discrimination against the 
Palestinians in society (Ibid.: 89). Of repressive dynamics in this regard, it can also be mentioned 
that it is made difficult for the opposition parties to organize and campaign, dividing the opposition 
and making it hard to vote (Albrecht, 2010: 38). Other kinds of repressive means are characterized 
with certain coercion such as limiting the opposition, with psychical harassment and expatriation 
but also elements from the so-called ‘soft repression’ including ways of restricting freedom of 
speech, censorship and pressure from security apparatus (Ibid.: 19). Also seen how the 
aforementioned strong security apparatus in the Middle East is limiting democracy. (Ibid.: 35). 
 
Despite such restrictions, liberal authoritarian systems actually allow civic and political activities 
along with a relatively free media without government censorship (Albrecht, 2010: 38). In that way, 
hindrances for activism exist without completely eliminating it, as seen in Jordan where human 
rights, religious groups and committees are initiated, often with the aim of including opposition 
actors in policy-orientated processes. Such systems thus rely very much on repression but always 
exist with certain formal and informal rules such as constitutions and cultural conditions (Ibid.: 5-
6). Despite the observation of more civil society associations and that a plurality of views, including 
Western discourse on human rights, is legal in Jordan, it is hard to point out how civil activism is 
positively contributing to more liberalization in the political system. This makes it obvious that the 
framework is not created to the benefit of activism (Cavatorta & Durac, 2011: 90) but a way for the 
Jordanian regime to manipulate the space of civil society, and a result of the controlled 
liberalization that King Abdullah II is practicing (Ibid.: 86).  
 
Inspiration to distinguish between the different groups in Jordan was found from the three main 
modes of opposition seen under authoritarianism; regime-loyal opposition that works within the 
framework of the regime; tolerated opposition; and anti-system opposition. More specifically, the 
first-mentioned consists of several legal political parties and workers’ unions that often stand out as 
opposition when reforms of liberal economy appear; the tolerated opposition is more independent 
from the state but it still controls this opposition with co-option and coercion, with several 
democracy and human rights fighters as seen in Jordan; the anti-system opposition largely consists 
of the Islamist movements both being radical and moderate groups and even including some very 
politicized human rights and democracy groups when refusing to take part in the regime’s forms of 
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co-optation (Albrecht, 2010: 21). Thereto the most typical targets for the opposition as either being 
the political regime; specific policies of the basic rules; and the structures of the regime in power 
which is often viewed as represented by an illegal opposition. The more regime-loyal opposition 
mostly prefers fighting for access to the political arena rather than about the power to rule. (Ibid.: 
7). As will be shown in the analysis, the political challengers typically have the choices of 
confronting the regime from different terms being; ‘exit’, ‘mixed-voice’ and ‘loyalty’. The exit 
strategy including not participating in political processes; the mixed-voice strategy consisting of 
participation in the process through continuing to criticize the regime vocally and sustain their 
demands for political change; and the loyalty strategy as an abandoning of demands for 
fundamental restructuring of the political system and choice to participation (Ibid.: 42). In 
challenging the regime, however, the opposition must try to avoid ‘the radicalization trap’ defined 
as when a certain group makes use of radical moves, such as food riots and worker protests as seen 
in Jordan against neoliberal economic reforms. If doing so, the regime might utilize it to exclude 
them from the political arena, and attempting to make people loose faith in the group (Ibid.: 22-23). 
 
Thereto the importance of collective over individual action with organizational associations and the 
longer it is managed to be maintained, the harder it will be to be suppressed (Albrecht, 2010: 39) 
which is an ongoing self-critical awareness among several informants, that they believe they are in 
lack of. An important point here is how the regime and the opposition actually shape each other, 
since the ruling regime can influence the opposition via laws and institutional initiatives which 
means certain groups are given more allowance to exist over others (Ibid.: 8). An example of this is 
that such regimes rarely represent a clear ideological approach, which is reflected in the opposition 
from the fact that they often develop their own program from preferences (Ibid.: 19) also present in 
the Jordanian society. It is thus a useful starting point to include the general three types of struggles; 
the first against forms of domination as ethnic, social and religious; the second being against forms 
of exploitation which separate individuals from what they produce; the third against that which ties 
the individual to himself and submits him to others, which is thus against subjection, forms of 
subjectivity and obedience (Foucault, 1982: 781). 
 
Throughout the analysis of the Jordanian regime’s Royal Narrative about the socio-political issues 
in the country, the possibly explanations for why a dominating regime accepts the emergence of 
opposition will be pointed out. First ‘the representation dimension’ accepting a certain 
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representation of social interests to signal to the surroundings that opposition is allowed showing a 
democratic image in responds to foreign demands. This both helps the regime to avoid a possibly 
military intervention, especially after 9/11, and moreover attracts political rents. Secondly ‘the 
legitimacy dimension’, where political opposition exists as an important tool to increase the 
legitimacy of an authoritarian polity, so the local target group will show more acceptances. This 
includes a focus in the media on political reform, which although not being of serious gravity may 
lead to the citizens acknowledging a gradual increase in political freedoms. Thirdly ‘the channeling 
dimension’, which means opposition has the use of helping the regime to be knowledgeable about 
the societal anger instead of not being aware of underground forces that potentially could be the 
basis for social unrest and heavy protests. Lastly, I will focus on ‘the moderation dimension’ which 
is a way to turn resistance into a more moderate opposition (Albrecht, 2010: 27-29). An element I 
will argue is being used to a significant degree by the Jordanian regime. 
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Analysis 
Since there apparently are several versions and different views about what actually happened during 
the Jordanian uprisings, it will be of high importance to have the theory of narratives as a point of 
departure. The purpose of highlighting differences between the narratives is to aim better 
understanding how informants express sense of agency of wanting to belong to something bigger 
(Jackson, 2002) reflecting intersubjectivity. Naturally, theoretical aspects from all the other theories 
will be included in the analysis of the fights over the narratives of Jordan’s development. The 
analysis will be structured around three parts. 
 
The first part explores the Royal Narrative about the political incidents in Jordan represented by 
King Abdullah II followed by Osama and his statements about youth from an overall royal 
organizational perspective. As stated previously it is its own part before the more in-depth analysis 
of the main informants. The second part examines the politically active youths and their views of 
the significant political events during the past years. Inspired from the theory of narrative of how 
storytelling is grounded in variability between being active or passive in disempowering 
circumstances (Jackson, 2002), this part will be focusing on the informants’ active approach. In that 
way, the first and second part will aim to answer first working question; what kinds of divergences 
in relation to the significant political events are expressed by the King and the politically active 
informants through their narratives? The third part will focus on the informants’ more passive 
conditions under uncontrolled circumstances (Ibid.). In that way I will address working question 
two; how do the young political activists reflect the interactive meetings between themselves and the 
regime in relation to the recent significant political incidents? Both the second and third part will 
be structured in two parts by dividing between Mustafa and Ali, under reference as the Social Hirak, 
representing unions and earlier protests, from the younger activists Aisha, Hadia, Thaer and Fadwa 
primarily active from 2011, under the title the Jordanian uprisings. The attempt with answering the 
two working questions is to gain more insights about what actually happened during the Jordanian 
uprisings and how the narratives vary, which will highlight how the youths negotiate their position 
and space for action and thereby bringing me closer to answering the research question. 
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The Royal Narrative 
Praise the Arab Spring 
 
“The Arab Spring has been a wonderful opportunity for Jordan. We had been talking about reform 
and managed to implement very important economic reforms over the past 12 years” 
(King Abdullah II, Turkish Policy Quarter, 2012). 
 
Through narratives by King Abdullah II, there exists a continuous acknowledgement of the Arab 
Spring. They reflect his need to ‘feel rooted’ this being the social factor of participation in the 
community where the feeling of belonging adds to the inner sense of being part of a wider field 
(Jackson, 2002). This is structured around the repeated point that, how positive it has been for 
Jordan described by the King as “a call for dignity, justice, and freedom” (Turkish Policy Quarter, 
2012). During various times, the King underlines that when looking back in a few years, it will be a 
good story (ABC, 2011) reasoned in how after the “Arab Awakening” it is more realistic to 
implement reforms (National Public Radio, 2011). Underlined by; “I am with my people” (Al 
Hayat, 2012) also referring to his weekly visits to different society sectors (ABC, 2011) as 
strengthening his part in the community as being rooted. He goes on to describe the background for 
the Arab Spring as being rooted in poverty and unemployment, especially for young people up to 40 
years old (The Wall Street Journal, 2011). This reflects how unemployment is one of the youth’s 
main frustrations (Hoffman & Jamal, 2012) but reforms will also focus on economical aspects 
(Jordan Television, 2012). The King’s ‘sense of agency’, is his imagination of belonging to 
something big, reflecting his existential imperative and need for acknowledgement (Jackson, 2002) 
especially appears when he takes honour in having established the middle class claimed as a source 
for civil engagement that can advance reform and modernization (Al Ghad, 2010).  
 
By portraying the uprisings in Jordan, King Abdullah II makes use of the two counterpoints; the 
focus on ‘the self’ and the focus on the ‘not-self’ of all considered foreign to oneself (Jackson, 
2002) by making a comparison with other countries to proudly highlight the Jordanian uprisings. 
This is shown by the Jordanian authorities allowing demonstrations, and that nobody has been 
killed, because of the early decision to disarm the police (The Washington Post, 2011). He 
highlights how others might face an “Arab winter” in contrast to the soon to be “summer” for 
Jordan (BBC, 2011) referring to the upcoming reforms. By using comparison to other countries, 
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King Abdullah II makes Jordan stand out as living up to both the ‘representation dimension’, to 
show a democratic image; ‘the legitimacy dimension’ with a focus on reform; and the ‘moderation 
dimension’ of a way to turn resistance into a more moderate opposition (Albrecht, 2010). In that 
way, King Abdullah II uses speech as a supplement to action, and narratives as a coping strategy of 
manipulating words to transform his world to appear in a more bearable way (Jackson, 2002). 
 
With the wish for “a new Jordan as quickly as possible” (The Wall Street Journal, 2011) King 
Abdullah II wants to express flexibility for changing circumstances being the so-called ‘adaptive 
capacities’ which can be claimed to be rooted in the regime’s wish to remain in power (Albrecht, 
2010). He does so by proudly pointing out how the newly established National Dialogue Committee 
embarked on a new election law and a new political party law. Through open discussions focusing 
on human rights and against corruption, the committee among others included representatives of 
political parties, associations and youths6. Which makes him state that “I look at the crisis as an 
opportunity” (BBC, 2011). In his responds to the demands with political reforms, the King benefits 
another aim for the ‘adaptive capacities’, being support from groups that otherwise could have been 
a threat (Albrecht, 2010). 
Teamwork with the Opposition 
King Abdullah II clearly encourages the first mode of opposition being ‘regime-loyal’ as within the 
framework of the regime (Albrecht, 2010) when he claims that the only way for change is through 
the next parliament and future elections. This should go beyond “the catchy slogans” referring to 
other oppositional forces (Agence Frence Presse, 2012). He is in that way patronizing what he refers 
to as the second mode of opposition, being the tolerated one (Albrecht, 2010) where they express 
themselves via so-called ‘street politics’ being conflicts between a collective populace and the 
authorities in a physical space (Bayat, 1997). 
 
He also makes use of the ‘divide-and-rule tactic’ in relation to the population when referring to 
some violent accidents, stating that the people are aware enough to differentiate between legitimate 
politically activity and sabotage (Jordanian Television, 2012). Moreover how the King, in relation 
to the Muslim Brotherhood, makes use of the so-called ‘radicalization trap’ being to highlight a 
certain groups’ radical moves to make people loose faith in them (Albrecht, 2010) when referring to 
their boycotts of elections as having; “adversely affected their credibility” (Al Hayat, 2014). He is 
                                                 
6
 http://www.jordanembassyus.org/politics/timeline-political-reform  
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in that way criticizing them for using one of the three oppositional typical confrontational terms 
being ‘exit’ of non-participation in political processes. But he also uses the two others to highlight a 
good relationship to opposition being ‘mixed-voice’ as continuously participation despite criticism; 
and ‘loyalty’ (Albrecht, 2010). When he also acknowledges the Muslim Brotherhood as the only 
organized ones (The Wall Street Journal, 2011) he highlights them in relation to ‘the legitimacy 
dimension’ portraying the existing of political opposition to gain acceptance from local actors 
(Albrecht, 2010). 
 
The above mentioned reflects how the Arab Spring can be enhanced in a ‘positive sense’ rooted in 
that at least something has changed (Schielke, 2011) which King Abdullah II highlights, making 
him stand out as an Arab leader that wants to take part of the Jordanian uprisings and stand out as a 
man of reform. By highlighting the following of his statements, I will show how there is moreover a 
tendency for him being a so-called ‘free-rider’ which Bayat (2013) defines as an actor that has 
stayed silent but then attempts to become target of the mobilization. As when King Abdullah II 
states that the Arab Spring includes “rolling up ourselves and now doing the hard work to achieve 
political reform” (BBC, 2011); this achieved with guidance that he highlights as; ‘We define the 
framework of the future, and now get people involved in the political process through voting’ (The 
Wall Street Journal, 2011), leaving an impression that King Abdullah II is the front person. 
 
In reference to give up some of the power, the point that liberal authoritarian systems actually allow 
civic and political activities (Albrecht, 2010) is reflected. The new parliament that follows should 
among others include economic and social reforms described as “collective responsibilities”, that 
voters and civil society institutions should hold the parliament accountable for (Al Rai, 2012). The 
collective responsibilities can be seen as ‘soft repression’ as ways of holding people down 
(Albrecht, 2010) since King Abdullah II has big expectations to the Lower House (Al Hayat, 2012), 
though this part has been proven not to have big political influence (Bank & Schlumberger, 2004: 
38). The responsibility of people is to vote in the representatives in the Lower House and they can 
afterwards hold them responsible for any failures, which make the King appear less responsible for 
potential failures, reflecting how regime and opposition shape each other (Albrecht, 2010). 
 
King Abdullah II also uses narratives to pressure the youths, reflecting the expectation for them to 
directly become responsible adults (Bayat & Herrera, 2010a), as when referring to the future as; 
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“this is your responsibility” (The Jordan Youth Forum, 2011). This reflects the point made by 
Schielke that gaining respect for Arab youth can be hard (2009) when the King is encouraging them 
to get involved in spheres of political institutions leading to more awareness and guidance (We Are 
All Jordan Youth Conference, 2007). In that way, the engagement of the youth within the 
previously mentioned regime-loyal opposition is kept (Albrecht, 2010). 
 
But change takes time. This seems to be one of King Abdullah II’s main messages and I will show 
how he is using this argument seen in relation to what Schielke (2011) defines as ‘two blind spots’. 
The first of these is how hard it can be to achieve social and political change; and secondly how the 
fantastic moment during the uprisings goes beyond what is possible. As when stating that if he was 
to decide about change it would be “Today, rather than tomorrow. But reality suggests otherwise”, 
referring to how essential details can be forgotten in the wish of building a sustainable democracy 
when the enthusiasm carries people away (Asharq Al Awsat, 2013). Or when mentioning the 
desired outcome of an evolution, being more political parties in Jordan (Le Nouvel Observatour, 
2013), requiring establishment of a right, left and centre which; “takes time for people to look along 
those lines” (National Public Radio, 2011). This reveals how, that under an authoritarian regime, 
that almost never represents an ideological standpoint the opposition will then also appear as non-
ideological (Albrecht, 2010). This reflects controlled liberalization practised within a framework for 
civil activism that is actually only to manipulate civil society (Cavatorta & Durac, 2011). 
 
Foucault’s point that researchers should focus on subjection and domination in relation to power 
(1980) is reflected when King Abdullah II uses his position to state the challenge to achieve change 
as rooted in the people’s lack of a “democratic mentality”. This specified in how he during town-
hall meetings are faced with “blank looks” from people when discussing political reform (National 
Public Radio, 2011) making him request for national political maturity (The Associated Press, 
2013). This structure of his narratives reveals how silencing others is a part of acting repressively 
making it hard for the ones targeted to speak up (Foucault, 1978). By claiming that it is reasoned in 
lack of democratic values he underlines how it can be manifested so deeply that it potentially will 
take long time to change, which is the fundament for the ‘repressive hypothesis’ (Ibid.).  
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Regional Impact 
King Abdullah II’s views upon potential regional spillovers reflect how lack of democracy in a 
Middle Eastern country can be rooted in the strong consideration of security (Albrecht, 2010). The 
King is continuously stressing out the importance of protecting the population (Al Ghad, 2010) also 
helped fought against by international partners. This in relation to how Jordan is in the middle of a 
region “in flames” where less stability and increased violence in Syria is direct threat. Also pointing 
out the big number of Syrian refugees in Jordan as a pressure on services and natural resources (Al 
Hayat, 2012), also increasing the competition for Jordanians in the labour market (Asharq Al 
Awsat, 2013). Extremism should be decreased with combating poverty and unemployment which is 
done with the Jordanian model and its focus on true Islam (Al Hayat, 2014). It also led to 
participation in the coalition against Islamic State (IS) (CNN, 2015b), the King claiming that people 
would never compromise the safety of Jordan since “it is their blood” (Al Hayat, 2012), reflecting 
how blood relations are an element of power to build up alliances (Foucault, 1978). Here important 
to mention the death of the Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh that King Abdullah II refers to as “a 
son of the Arab Army” “a brother” and “our brave hero” and in that way makes use of the so-
called counter-narratives to uphold an attitude (Onodera, 2011). He believes that the video showing 
how he was burned to death is an attempt for IS, to intimidate Jordanians but it had the opposite 
effect that it has just motivated the Jordanians and ‘the gloves have come off’ (CNN, 2015). 
Reinforcing the Royal Narrative 
I was surprised that Osama, a well-respected previous head of a youth program for King Abdullah 
II Development Fund, being close to the royal elite, and now a chairman in one of the most affluent 
banks, took time to meet me. From the content of the narrative I must presume that he had a wish to 
represent his version of Jordan status quo which had several similarities with King Abdullah II’s 
views. The strategies behind the narrative by Osama is reflected by being an attempt to make 
something public and moreover maintaining a ‘sense of agency’ as reconstructing events in times of 
crisis (Jackson, 2002) since he was convinced of the positive aspects for Jordan being “very well 
positioned” (Appendix H, p. 91) in relation to how the West will work with relief and eventually 
construction in Syria and Iraq. Despite him acknowledging bad consequences for the mentioned 
countries, he presented an overall ‘positive sense’ after the Arab Spring (Schielke, 2011) stated as 
“If we achieve these things, I am definitely positive” (Appendix H, p. 95). 
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Of the main thing needed is youth to be less marginalized which he defines as neither being 
politically or economically engaged. He therefore not only acknowledges that youth is a vulnerable 
time to go through (Bayat & Herrera 2010a) but also the ‘sense of agency’ on behalf of them as the 
need to be understood and an imagination to belong to something big (Jackson, 2002), stated by 
him as “cementing a sense of national identity” (Appendix H, p. 92) reflecting the human need to 
‘feel rooted’ (Jackson, 2002). He thereto portrays himself as flexible and expresses ‘adaptive 
capacities’ to change the circumstances (Albrecht, 2010) with the program in the fund aiming to 
give young people critical employment and life skills. More specifically, he believes they should be 
sent to summer schools and he thinks of it as “(…) a country thinks of a military draft. Everybody 
has to go” (Appendix H, p. 93) focusing on the civics described as teaching about human rights, 
respecting others and dialogue to provide meaningful experiences that form identities, reflecting the 
point that an subjectivity is made up by several voices (Schielke, 2009), potentially one of them 
being the program represented by Osama. 
 
The purpose of this military-inspired discipline is to learn how to respect authorities and rules since 
the youth today has “that kind of attitude with a lack of structure” followed by giving them some 
“key private sector skills” (Appendix H, p. 93) selecting the unique participants with potential as 
future leaders and help them finding a job. It both reflects how youths in the Middle East have to 
work hard to gain respect moreover how their need for youthfulness is being challenged since there 
is an expectation for them to become adults straight away (Bayat & Herrera, 2010a) and how being 
is more a matter of ‘becoming rather than belonging’ (Jackson, 2002). Osama believes one of the 
hindrances to achieve this is the school system and its teachers (Appendix H, p. 94). Here, Osama 
makes use of the ‘divide-and-rule tactic’ (Albrecht, 2010) between the school system and the vision 
of the program, when stating that “I can’t wait for this type of reform” (Appendix H, p. 94). 
Though he emphasizes that it will take time because; the curriculum needs to be revised, which is 
“a very long controversial issue” (Appendix H, p. 94). This is rooted in fights between 
conservatives vs. liberals and that teachers are highly unqualified yet unified and resist change. 
 
But King Abdullah II Development Fund’s youth programs with civic and economic engagement 
make the kids “slowly, slowly, gradually” (Appendix H, p. 94) feel comfortable to discuss things, 
and by engaging socially and politically a student council can be created where the youths can run 
and be elected which reflects a tendency from his side to acknowledge the ‘regime-loyal’ mode of 
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opposition as the King, being groups formations that can potentially run for elections (Albrecht, 
2010). His comment that “So I am mostly excited about this experiment and it is really fantastic” 
(Appendix H, p. 95) underlines the need to represent the status quo of Jordan and its youth which 
can reflect ‘the representation dimension’ showing a democratic image to his surroundings, in this 
case being a western female master thesis student. But also ‘the legitimacy dimension’ appealing to 
the local youth including focus on political reform, whereby when speaking of political awareness, 
he refers to use of social media; election voting; participate in town hall meetings; boycotting; 
striking; and writing in the press which arguable also reflect the third dimension, ‘the moderation’ 
being a way to turn resistance into a more moderate opposition (Albrecht, 2010). Despite some of 
the mentioned actions being similar to ‘submerged networks’, including awareness-raising and 
online critiques (Onodera, 2009), Osama’s continuously pointing toward elections underlines the 
same believe of regime-loyal opposition as the King. Overall, this narrative could reflect the point 
about how young people’s wishes for change depend on the authorities’ control over them (Bayat, 
2010) but before taken that for granted, the narratives by the young activists will follow. 
Interim Conclusion 
I have argued that King Abdullah II’s narratives are reflecting the theoretical points about strategies 
behind narratives, first being to transform private into public in this case being how his own 
ambitions for Jordan represent the official version of the country. Secondly how he uses narratives 
as maintaining a sense of agency in confrontation with disempowering circumstances. Especially 
including how he in relation to the Arab Spring is attempting to write himself into the history of 
Jordan as a leader that not only backs up the Arab Spring but also took part in setting the tone for 
more democratization. By bringing in Osama, I have highlighted how this is an example on an actor 
that is reproducing the same Royal Narrative about Jordan and its youth. 
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The Youth & Their Active Approach 
The Social Hirak 
For this analytical part the overall goal will be to show how the ‘existential imperative’ for both 
Mustafa and Ali is reflected in their narratives about the protests. Their need to belong to something 
bigger (Jackson, 2002) is obvious from them wanting to represent the poor and marginalized 
respectively through the Workers’ Union and the Democratic Youth Union which is their way of 
being active. This collective gathering in groups reflects how under characteristics of totalitarian 
systems marginalization can create existential crisis that can make people feel powerless, whereto 
storytelling can be a mediator to gain a sense of control reflected through collective belonging 
(Ibid.). This will be emphasized through the ‘normative registers’ as a way to speak about topics 
where the choice between the seven registers characterizes the subject (Schielke, 2009) as kinds of 
values and motivations that are driving Mustafa and Ali to their fights. The main register for both of 
them is ‘social justice and rights’ since their tendency towards leftist political orientation reflects 
their socialist opinion, respectively being Ali’s work with the leftist parties and Mustafa’s wish for a 
social revolution. They attack the privatized system for marginalizing the population, the system for 
being corrupt and the authoritarian kingdom for minimizing their potential opportunities as what 
they are mainly active against. The following quote moreover shows how Mustafa through his 
critique is distinguishing himself from the political authorities and makes them appear as enemies 
without moral; 
 
“The regime and the governments made this change (…) took the life vain of this municipality 
which is the water, they took all the water from this area and gave it to Amman and they did this in 
a careless way without finding alternative ways for the people (…) and the youths found themselves 
unemployed because of this decision in the 1990s” 
(Appendix B, p. 4) 
 
Ali’s critique of corruption also makes the authorities appear as enemies with no moral (Jackson, 
2002). He believes corruption is when people sell land and take a big part in commission. Both 
Mustafa’s and Ali’s statements about the authorities make it sounds like the top powers are almost 
against the people whereto they distinguish themselves against the once in power. In that way, 
elements of the first kind of struggle being against forms of social domination is reflected and 
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moreover the second type of struggle being against forms of exploitation which separates 
individuals from what they produces (Foucault, 1982). 
 
With their view as this being a problematic background, they aim to change the otherwise 
disempowering circumstances by fighting for the poor and marginalized people seen in relation to 
the normative register of having a ‘good character’. This includes sympathy and offering help 
(Schielke, 2009) which is for example expressed when the number of protesters increases and 
Mustafa believing that whoever is protesting with them has the right to secure the changes they 
want. These actions can be said to reflect the theoretical point that it is more a matter of a person 
imagining having human freedom than if it actually exists (Jackson, 2002); “I am proud we stand 
with the suppressed and in solidarity with the poor” (Appendix B, p. 4). 
 
From listening to the narratives by Mustafa and Ali it is also relevant to bring in the normative 
register of ‘respect’ including a person’s social status in the community since their different ways of 
using ‘I’ or ‘we’ reflect their desire for gaining a respectful status. Since their interactions between 
themselves and others are highlighted so clearly in their transformation of their stories, it results in 
reflecting their intersubjectivity (Jackson, 2002) as their self-understanding of how they prefer to 
represent themselves (Hastrup, 2003a: 10) as truly understanding the poor which they are proud of. 
Despite having cooperated for the demonstrations in 2011 it here becomes crucial that they 
represent two different groups (Bayat, 2010a) especially in relation to the case of the teachers. 
Mustafa briefly mentions that their fight, being inspired from the Worker’s Union, was noticed by 
the media and they also cooperated in the big demonstration January 14, 2011. But other than that 
he describes it as “there was nothing about it, not a big deal” (Appendix B, p. 14). Compared to 
when Ali explains how the Democratic Youth Union had solidarity with the teachers and he felt 
encouraged not only to participate with a speech at their event but also states that “I did something 
that made a change” (Appendix C, p. 29) when he made his father, working as a teacher, gather lots 
of teachers in Amman for demonstrations. This underlines a certain self-acknowledgement making 
the ego shine and even potentially enlarged when Ali claims that “the peak was the teacher’s 
revolution in 2010” (Appendix C, p. 27). This can show a potential fight over the narratives about 
the uprisings in Jordan because even though Mustafa in general uses ‘we’ and thereby flashes his 
respectful position in a more humble way, it also promotes himself. As for instance at an official 
debate where the Prime Minister was present, Mustafa retells how the participants expressed their 
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respect for Mustafa by blaming the Prime Minister for insulting him, which led to; “I felt very 
motivated and I stood up and started repeating the same slogans we were saying outside (…) and 
then everyone in the room was repeating after me” (Appendix B, p. 11). He also directly points out 
that he was the initiator and leader of the Worker’s Union. These aspects are linked to the normative 
register of ‘success and self-realization’ including ensuring a place in life and gaining more 
experience (Schielke, 2009) whereby the above mentioned statements give both of them positions 
of initiating protests. In addition to this Ali being involved in politics since university added to his 
mentioned achievements shows how intersubjectivity it is a part of his success in life. 
 
This leads to their personal motivations for fighting. Ali expresses his main motivation as wanting a 
secular society with freedom “where people play oud7 and drink beers without feeling there is a 
social condition authority” (Appendix C, p. 31) also wishing for more social fairness and justice 
combined with a country that is productive in agriculture instead of being a consumer society. This 
reflects how the contemporary Arab young activist stands out as less religious and more supportive 
of secular politics (Hoffman & Jamal, 2012). For Mustafa it is related to his background of being 
raised in poverty, facing hard times supporting his own family from a low salary which made him 
wanting to fight for change, “after living the injustice, and all the things that I faced myself got me 
to be that angry and made me feel like ‘I have to do something’” (Appendix B, p. 24). This reflects 
how some rebel because of their poor living conditions against the economical system of free 
market and corruption (Bayat & Herrera, 2010b). In that way, the normative register of ‘family’ 
(Schielke, 2009) is also an aspect for Mustafa’s fight underlined when he refers to a time where “my 
kids were just about dying from hunger” (Appendix B, p. 24), standing in opposition to Ali who is 
neither married nor with children. These are some of the aspects that make them going to the streets 
and demonstrate characterised as ‘street politics’ (Bayat, 1997) as Mustafa states; “We want to work 
on the level of raising awareness and freedom of mind” (Appendix B, p. 19). Also in more creative 
ways, as when Ali in a political event hung up figures of corrupted people as executions, 
characterised as street awareness-raising campaigns as ‘submerged networks’ (Onodera, 2009). This 
reflects the third type of struggle against that which ties the individual to him and submits him to 
others in this way being against subjection and forms of subjectivities (Foucault, 1982). 
 
                                                 
7
 String-instrument commonly used in Arab and Middle Eastern music 
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The narratives by Mustafa and Ali are clearly identified as a human need for feeling rooted which is 
linked to their participation in the community. This reflection of intersubjectivity contributes to a 
feeling of belonging and an inner sense of consisting to a wider field of being (Jackson, 2002). This 
is reflected in the structures of their narratives with Mustafa initiating the interview with the history 
of Jordan and Ali including historical aspects from Dibarn as a special place for protests because of 
the inhabitants’ roots in the community. This reflects two theoretical points. First being that ‘the 
continuity theory of the Egyptian revolution’ stating that the 2011 uprisings should rather be 
understood as a potential return to a historical normality than as exceptional (Schielke, 2011) and 
second that historical investigation is needed to understand mechanisms of power (Foucault, 1980). 
 
Mustafa’s interpretation of Jordan’s history emphasizes the honourable aspects of the people living 
from agriculture being more independent from the state, though challenged by the authorities’ plans 
from the 1980s encouraging people to work more in the public sector followed by the 1990s with 
increased privatization. In that way the overall framework for his narrative is structured around how 
the hostile authorities through capitalism took them away from ‘the good old days’ (Foucault, 
2000). Ali highlights Dibarn as being the city for riots because of the nature of the people that he 
defines as having; “a fighter character” (Appendix C, p. 30). This goes all the way back to the 
creation of Jordan and the Dibarn inhabitants being in conflict with the establisher King Abdullah I 
because they resisted him taking the power. This reflects the point about how blood relations can be 
an important element in the mechanisms of power to build of alliances (Foucault, 1978). Both 
Mustafa and Ali thereto recognize themselves as following earlier riots such as when Ali 
encouraged his father to gather the teachers; “there was a riot in 1989 in Jordan, and Amman did 
not participate (…) so at that point when I asked my father to do that that was a point where the 
capital should break the wall” (Appendix C, p. 29). This statement can be defined as a way of 
writing themselves into the story of Jordan, clearly reflecting the need to belong to something 
bigger (Jackson, 2002). From these historical perspectives both Mustafa and Ali acknowledge that 
the 2011 uprisings were not exceptional but they claim that they had a lead on the demands. 
 
It is valid to bring in the theoretical point of having the ‘global-local’ perspective (Bayat & Herrera, 
2010a) reflected in this case how the Social Hirak took a turn because of regional dynamics. Both 
Mustafa and Ali found it a bit humorous how their common slogan being “‘where are you dear’” 
(Appendix C, p. 29) written on bread, as symbolizing quality of life, got misunderstood by people 
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because ‘dear’ in Arabic is translated into ‘a’azezi’. This word actually sounds like ‘Bouazizi’, the 
name of the Tunisian man who set fire to himself, which kick-started the Arab Spring, leading to 
the observation that media questioned if this was the beginning of a Jordanian Arab Spring 
(Appendix B, p. 14). Because of the historical background stated above, both Mustafa and Ali 
refuse to have been inspired by the regional Arab Spring but acknowledge that other’s interests 
appeared and took lead on the protests; 
 
“We were doing our job separately and we were achieving some things then in the time of mid-2011 
because there is Arab Spring around the region affected us negatively in a way that lots of people 
getting involved and our public hirak is for certain demands but then with the Muslim Brotherhood 
joining (…) our main demands were affected by new demands that we are not asking for” 
(Appendix B, page 17). 
 
It here becomes important to bring in the point that movements are defined by their claims and not 
solely their actors (Bayat, 2010a) where it is crucial to distinguish between various movements to 
understand what happened with the Jordanian uprisings. Rooted in Mustafa and Ali claiming that 
the Muslim Brotherhood later on took over the mobilization, it reflects how there were also ‘free-
riders’ people that stayed quite for a while before getting involved, who can then take lead over 
protests (Bayat, 2013). More specifically how Mustafa characterizes the unions’ fight as; “it was a 
social hirak, on the level of the poor people and wanting to create a welfare system that protects the 
poor people from the higher hand of the corrupted people” (Appendix B, p. 18). This is in 
opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood’s more political approach that Mustafa claims to be about 
changing the constitution and the election law so they could get more seats within the parliament 
which he does not believe has anything to do with the people. It is moreover stated that the idea of 
claiming the fall of the regime were demands coming from an orientation of the Muslim 
Brotherhood; “sending people on the ground to ask for that to change the compass of hirak” 
(Appendix B, p. 18). 
 
Both Mustafa and Ali mention that the youth started to participate when the hirak became more 
general, Mustafa believing that it was both a result from the Social Hirak escalating since 2006 and 
the young people being inspired from the regional Arab Spring in 2011. But in contrast to the 
individual unemployed youth that participated in their Social Hirak, the youngsters from 2011 are 
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claimed as being unorganized and partly responsible for why the protests became more violent. This 
possibly reflects Bayat’s point that in the aim of being a collective challenge to the authorities, 
‘young people’ have to turn into ‘youth’ as a social category consisting of social actors before their 
fights can be incessant (2010). This underlined by Ali; “I just want to make the point that we were 
not stupid youth doing random things, we were planned” (Appendix C, p. 41). Mustafa also 
distances himself from the violence, claiming that it made people lose the trust in hirak. From the 
above it shows that life is a road and in travelling it some follow the tracks of those who have gone 
before, seen as the Social Hirak, and others leave traces to the ones which become (Jackson, 2002), 
leading to the youths of the Jordanian uprisings. 
The Jordanian Uprisings 
This section will focus on young politically active informants not affiliated to specific unions as the 
ones above. Through the narratives by the Policy Advisor Fadwa, the critical journalist Aisha, the 
street fighter Hadia, and the intellectual NGO-worker Thaer their sense of agency of belonging to 
something bigger (Jackson, 2002) will be reflected. A commonality amongst the last three 
individuals is participation in the Jordanian uprisings in mid-2011 with ‘street politics’, being 
conflicts with the authorities in public areas (Bayat, 1997). However, Fadwa stands out since she is 
merely diplomatic as she refers to ‘we’ about the organization actively fighting for youth.  
 
They all express an active approach against what they consider disempowering circumstances being 
the authoritarian system and the traditional stereotyping of young people which is related to how 
their statements reflect a sense of control from having a feeling of collective belonging (Jackson, 
2002) being youth of Jordan. Fadwa underlines the specific needs for the youth as employment, 
better education, social status and economic justice but the biggest challenge for youth is underlined 
by all of them as being frustrated. This will briefly be described since it reflects the theoretical 
claim for youthfulness rooted in collective challenge of defending ways of being related to being 
young (Bayat & Herrera, 2010a). Firstly socially frustration from not having any outlets or any 
kinds of activities for being young and feeling free, which is related to how public arenas such as 
malls and street corners are the only compensation (Bayat, 2010). Secondly there is sexual 
frustration emphasized by Thaer as; “the Muslim Brotherhood has been telling everyone that 
‘females are the fire and males are the gasoline, if you mix them together you will have an 
explosion’” (Appendix G, p. 88), which he believes explains the division in the population and the 
prevalence of sexual harassment. Thirdly, frustration about the education system and lack of 
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political outcomes is mentioned, but that will be elaborated further on since the focus here is on 
their active approach. As Hadia states; “No one will give you your rights if you are just sitting there 
waiting for them. Until you say something or you do something” (Appendix F, p. 74). She believes 
that the biggest challenge for Jordanian youth is to fight their fear of reacting. 
 
By bringing in the normative registers, an elaboration will be made to investigate what kinds of 
values and motivation is behind their thoughts and actions (Schielke, 2009). The register of ‘social 
justice and rights’ is crucial for Hadia and Thaer for participating in the protests, but rather than 
being linked to specific organisations, their street activism have tendencies to come from the ‘non-
movements’. These ‘non-movements’ represent collective actions focusing on people as citizens 
with rights being defined as ‘the new world order’, consisting of an iconic imagery of human rights 
with hopes for justice and equality (Bayat, 2013). In addition to Hadia’s repeated complaints about 
the high prices in Jordan, that she demanded to get lowered, she also reasons her participation in the 
demonstrations to get rid of the Prime Minister since she wants the option to elect him herself. She 
demands freedom of speech that she explains “will lead to the whole thing” (Appendix F, p. 66); 
asking for investigation of many corruption cases and “reforms for everything, the politics here in 
Jordan is messed up” (Appendix F, p. 67). In that way it is tempting to define Hadia as leaning 
towards ‘refo-lutions’ fighting for the regime to reform itself (Bayat, 2013), moreover reflecting 
that the aim with being critical is to uncover a certain idea and trying to make sure it is no longer 
taken for granted (Foucault, 2000). If it was not for the fact that she regrets they did not ask for 
more than reforms; “we did not get reform, maybe if we had asked for the fall of the king (…) but 
we asked for little and we got nothing at all” (Appendix F, p. 68). She also expresses 
disappointment of the population that she expected to at least start questioning after activists did the 
hard work of being in front, in fights and ending in prisons. 
 
Thaer on the other hand directly states that reform is not the solution; “For a system that is build to 
be the agent of other countries in this region, you cannot reform that” (Appendix G, p. 88). He 
explains how he gathered with people being angry about the high prices on gas and other living 
expenses demanding not only the Prime Minister but the King to go fall reflecting the ‘public 
nagging’ consisting of high prices and targeting the government (Bayat, 2013). Moreover, the point 
about that despite Arab youth today being more educated and likely to protest, they may lack of 
specific direction in their approaches and ideas (Hoffman & Jamal, 2012) becomes relevant when 
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Thaer explains that; “I thought that it would change stuff and I was not fully aware of how it should 
be done. So I was just with the people” (Appendix G, p. 83).  
 
This sympathy and offering of help to people reflect the normative register of being a ‘good 
character’ (Schielke, 2009) which is also the case for Hadia several times underlining that Jordan is 
not only Amman but also southern cities with big issues such as Tafilah and Karak; “In Amman we 
went to demonstrate to free the Tafilah people and get them out of jail, but then we were beaten up 
and went to jail here” (Appendix F, p. 67). This is related to her description of solidarity among 
several hiraks in Jordan possibly reflected as ‘passive networks’ since they notice each other from 
similar status, gather spontaneously and transform into active network or collective action (Bayat, 
1997); “In Amman it is a group of people and even if they are not hirak shabab al Jordani 
(Jordanian youth riots) they are in somehow called hirak because they go to demonstrations, meet 
us everyday, work together in campaigns” (Appendix F, p. 68). This not only confirms the 
aforementioned point about ‘non-movements’ (Bayat, 2013), but also that during youth bulges, 
barriers that would previously separate rural and urban youth, can vanish (Bayat, 2010). From 
Thaer’s perspective ‘the good character’ is expressed through his Pan-Arab conviction that he will 
fight for his country, which he sees as the whole Arab region; 
 
“So I would be happy to help with anything that can help to my country. Even if I got killed in the 
meantime and this goes to any Arab country because I believe that for any Arab country I would die 
very happily to do that and this is not for showing off or something, it is something I believe in 
because I believe that the collective rights are very much more important than the person’s rights” 
(Appendix G, page 84). 
 
Interestingly enough the normative registers of ‘social justice and rights’ and ‘good character’ 
(Schielke, 2009) would for Aisha and Fadwa most likely also be claimed as being their primary 
motivation for respectively participating in the Jordanian uprisings and fight for better conditions 
for youth. This is when Aisha highlights that “I read about politics all the time, I am a very big fan 
of human rights and always talk about it” (Appendix E, p. 54) adding that she assists in crisis 
situations for Syrian refugees and that her mother works as a lawyer for human rights. But her 
narrative reveals a stronger tendency for the normative register of ‘success and self-realization’ 
including finding a place in life and gaining experience (Schielke, 2009) since the most frequent 
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reference for participation is based on her individual motivation such as returning to Jordan after the 
Arab Spring started. Because even though she never knew she would be a journalist she was driven 
by; “it was just during the Arab Spring suddenly I felt that I had so many opinions that I was not 
aware of (…) I remember the first time in my life, being very excited about the region in a way that I 
haven’t been before” (Appendix E, p. 54). This characterizes ‘citizen journalism’ to reveal what is 
going on during protests based on the fundament as ‘rights to have rights (Onodera, 2011). 
 
For Fadwa, the framework of her job in a NGO functions as a fundament for wanting to increase 
‘social justice and rights’ as when she highlights how organizations are focused on youth and that 
the organizational approach will likely achieve more changes than riots will. This shows the need 
for young people to claim their own social and cultural spaces (Bayat & Herrera, 2010a) which 
Fadwa is attempting for Jordanian youth. Her approach is also to attack the political repressive 
structures though in a more diplomatic way, as for example when ‘we’ in the organization are 
fighting to break with the standard that youth are not involved in the political sphere, except for the 
university politics, adding that there are only older people from the elite in the parliament; “I mean, 
they are dinosaurs so there is no youth representation anywhere” (Appendix D, p. 44). This 
specific fight for more youth representation by criticising the public sector enterprises, clearly states 
out the fight for youthfulness and demands about them entering more political and social spaces 
(Bayat & Herrera, 2010a). 
 
Even more being challenged by her claiming that the whole governmental structure is completely 
recycling the people; “So intelligence goes to the senate, the senate goes to the parliament, the 
parliament person goes to minister” (Appendix D, p. 49). Her fight for the youth of Jordan reflects 
the normative register of a ‘good character’ though the structure of her narrative reveals a degree of 
the normative register ‘success and self-realization’ (Schielke, 2009). This being how she answers 
with politicised facts as how youths are affected by the Jordanian policy which potentially reasoned 
in her function as a Policy Advisor and represent an almost diplomatic role. This also confirmed 
from her sharing that she shortly after the interview participated with a speech in the United 
Nation’s Secretariat in New York focusing on youth participation. In that way, intersubjectivity 
from the experiences of acting diplomatically for youth’s rights in both local and global terms, is 
reflected from Fadwa’s need to belong to something bigger (Jackson, 2002). The ‘success & self-
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realization’ register can also to a lesser extend be said about Aisha and Thaer from their educational 
background respectively as Sustainable Development and International Relations (Schielke, 2009). 
 
The next relevant normative register ‘respect’, inevitable linked to the above mentioned, is even 
more specifically showing how their transformations of the experiences are related to their 
intersubjectivity and existential imperative to understand interactions with the world around them. 
For Fadwa it is linked to the above points that will potentially lead to a respective person with 
policy knowledge. For Aisha it can be said that she feels inspired by being an opinion former 
through her blog and articles having elements from ‘citizen journalism’ with its fundament of 
having rights to have rights (Onodera, 2011); “this kind of journalism can be a way of being an 
activist (…) I am studying journalism because I want to change things and want to be a better 
activist” (Appendix E, pp. 55-56) which reflects that she would like to be a respected person 
contributing to political awareness, inspired from a tactic originated in regional events, reflecting 
how intersubjectivity influence on how she would like to present herself (Hastrup, 2003a). 
 
But once again Aisha stands out compared to the others since the structure of her narrative is both 
initiated by her family background and shaped around being apprehensive to say general things 
about the Jordanian youth or society, related to her several years abroad. This is expressed when she 
continuously mentions other people as more knowledgeable than her; not feeling she is doing much 
for Jordan when she is away; and most clearly her stating that she did not go through several of the 
things the average poor Jordanian young person does. This reflects one of the challenges for youths 
of shifting between different roles and identities that should be included to understand 
subjectification, reflections and conflict (Schielke, 2009). In this case being how a conflict brought 
Aisha back to roots she had otherwise left and developed new reflections which confirms Jackson’s 
point about being is thus not a belonging but a becoming (2002). 
 
Also being the case for Fadwa that through her experiences go through a development making her 
become a knowledgeable person about Jordanian politics and youth. Though Hadia potentially also 
have several roles as for example recently having become a mother, the structure of her narrative 
primarily left an impression of confronting the gender roles and the traditional idea of a woman in 
the society; “The typical stereotype is that a girl should have a lower voice and I am screaming 
every day” (Appendix F, p. 70). This reflects how gender can be one of the complexities for youth 
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(Bayat & Herrera, 2010a) and Hadia attempting to break with a stereotype involving a specific 
societal group, she belongs to. 
 
For the case of Thaer’s narrative, it was structured with very precise answers set up in order which 
gave an impression of him wanting to be an almost intellectual activist expressed via; “But I have 
the facts. I build everything from the way we are living” (Appendix G, p. 79). The feeling of 
belonging and the human need to feel rooted (Jackson, 2002) is especially expressed through his 
nationalistic passion for the Arab region which to a certain extend can reflect the normative register 
of ‘love’ consisting of strong emotional commitment and complete surrender (Schielke, 2009). In 
that way, the elaboration of the normative registers for the young activists both reflect the first kind 
of struggle being against forms of social domination, also the second kind of struggle against forms 
of exploration separating individuals from what they produce and mostly reflecting the third kind of 
struggle against what ties the individual to him and submits him to others, in this way forms of 
subjectivation (Foucault, 1982). This is also reflected as intersubjectivity since the mentioned 
conditions are shaped by their understanding of common experiences with others in groups. 
 
As a wrap up on the narrative approach as a framework for this analysis, a focus on wording will be 
brought in. Bringing in here how the term Arab Spring can be mentioned in either pessimistic or 
positive means, respectively rooted in lack of positive results or the sense that at least something 
has changed (Schielke, 2011). The reflected sense of agency of belonging to something bigger 
through the narratives shows a clear intersubjectivity (Jackson, 2002) of how they either relate or 
distance themselves to the term and event Arab Spring, stating more specifically what kind of 
‘bigger’ they consider themselves as being a part of. Throughout her narrative Aisha acknowledges 
the Arab Spring both by using the word consequently, but her statement about that; “we really 
didn’t have an Arab Spring” (Appendix E, p. 61) and her rather critical approach towards that “the 
Arab Spring today no longer serves as an emblem of political change, but rather a false sense of 
achievement” (Appendix J, p. 101) referring to consequences seen in other countries, also shows a 
certain distance. Hadia also takes a step back from the title Arab Spring; 
 
“I really much hate the name” (…) Calling it the Arab Spring, you get the idea that it is all about 
spring and beauty, its not, but it is worth it, freedom is worth all the things that happened, but I love 
to call things more realistic (Appendix F, page 65). 
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She continuously uses the word ‘hirak shabab al Jordani’ (Jordanian youth riots) but despite giving 
it a more local touch, her narrative reveals a desire to speak up the Jordanian uprisings stating that it 
started in 2011, which confirms a connection to the Arab Spring of that time, even though she 
acknowledges previous Jordanian protests, and several times referring to violent aspects which is a 
characteristic as sacrifice for the Arab Spring. 
 
Despite shifting between the words Arab Spring and hirak during the narrative, Thaer also makes a 
distance; “I don’t like the word Arab Spring” (Appendix G, p. 80) being pessimistic about the 
status of youth after “the so-called Arab Spring” (Appendix G, p. 84) since a consequence from 
speaking politically now is a harsh reaction from people referring to the traumatic situations in 
Syria and Egypt. Also being related to the increased violence during the protests which Thaer 
believes came from lack of organisational skills and amongst youths, reflecting Bayat’s highlight of 
this to be a collective challenge (2013) which put the Muslim Brotherhood in a position to take a 
lead of the protests. An interesting consequence for the Muslim Brotherhood being ‘free-riders’ 
(Bayat, 2013) is how Fadwa claims that the Muslim Brotherhood started the Jordanian uprisings, 
which she describes as the instigators of the riots being inspired from the Arab Spring, making them 
call for reforms and demanding the government to step down. This potentially reflects use of 
second-hand sources instead of participating in the streets, since it is misleading compared to the 
narratives by Aisha, Hadia and Thaer that were in the protests.  The structure of the narratives by 
the three last-mentioned can be seen from three perspectives. First to grasp a sense of power of the 
overall Academic Narrative (Jackson, 2002) about the Jordanian uprisings that ‘nothing really 
happened’ compared to other countries, whereto a critical attitude can seem more knowledgeable 
instead of appearing naïve. Secondly to attack the Royal Narrative that is positive about all the 
reforms, by portraying the King as subhuman without moral (Jackson, 2002); and thirdly making 
distance to failed demands. 
Interim Conclusion 
Throughout the above analytical chapter, the first working question is addressed highlighting what 
kinds of divergences that appeared in relation to the Jordanian uprisings. According to Mustafa and 
Ali they were via their unions the first initiators of protests against the authoritarian regime and the 
corrupted policies in recent time, followed by the Muslim Brotherhood trying to take a lead on the 
Social Hirak and lastly compiled by the youth after being inspired by the regional Arab Spring. This 
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is shown via strategic use throughout their narratives stating themselves as organised and achieving 
some of their demands but then being too challenged by other actors to continue. According to the 
young activists, the Jordanian uprisings were initiated in 2011 even though acknowledging that 
some protests were previously attempt. Despite them claiming that none of their demands were met, 
they still recognize themselves as having contributed to the case with activism and spreading 
awareness about the repressing system in Jordan. However, they also accept the weakness of the 
protests because of influence from other actors namely the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime.  
 
The Youth & Their Passive Approach 
The Social Hirak 
For this analytical part the aim will be to highlight how the informants describe the outcomes of 
confronting the authorities and what their narratives about this potentially say about subjectivation. 
Mustafa and Ali both claim that the Jordanian regime is suppressing them with means reflecting the 
repressive tactics for an authoritarian regime to silence the opposition (Albrecht, 2010). Such as 
arresting them several times and using threats as when Ali receives a phone call from the manager 
of the Secret Service before the protests “he said ‘if anything happens, I will get you from your 
hair’” (Appendix C, p. 33). The so-called ‘soft repression’ as ways of censorship (Albrecht, 2010) 
can also be reflected in Mustafa’s claims about censorship in the newspaper where one of their 
protests in front of the Ministry of Agriculture was portrayed as greetings. Also how Mustafa 
asserts the regime as having the responsibility of him not being elected for the parliament; “the 
government changed the results because they didn’t want us in the government” (Appendix B, p. 
22). Moreover the offer about better living conditions if he stopped being active. 
 
Mustafa and Ali’s ability to be active also confirms how certain civil and political activities are 
allowed in the authoritarian regime (Albrecht, 2010), mainly reflected through the various meetings 
with ministers and prime ministers. This shows the use of ‘exclusive responsiveness’ consisting of 
the regime’s need for a certain society support as promising more democratic changes but the 
strategy behind is to neutralize the groups politically (Ibid.). This is seen in this case when the 
Worker’s Union was guaranteed permanent hiring of several workers but the promise was not held. 
It is also relevant to bring in the use of ‘divide-and-rule tactic’ attempting to divide groups (Ibid.) 
since Mustafa retells how “the minister was trying to be smart-ass to divide us, saying to the person 
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sitting next to me ‘okay, what are your problems?’” (Appendix B, p. 7) but since he had referred to 
Mustafa as the representative for them, the minister continued the dialogue with Mustafa. 
 
This leads to the reflection of a regime’s use of ‘adaptive capacities’ being very flexible for 
changing circumstances in the attempt to remain power (Albrecht, 2010). This is seen from the fact 
that the previous Prime Minister that Mustafa talked positively about afterwards got the position 
back. But since this came after relatively suspicious visits in Mustafa’s home by Americans that 
claimed to be journalists but that Mustafa, based on their investigative questions about politicians, 
believes came from the USA embassy, it moreover reflects how activists under authoritarian 
regimes fear the possibility of being under surveillance (Onodera, 2009), also referring back to Ali 
that the authorities knew was organising the protests. Worth mentioning is also the risk of falling 
into ‘the radicalization trap’ defined as risky for a group using radical moves to be heard (Albrecht, 
2010) such as when both Mustafa and Ali during their arrests make food strikes and the regime 
utilizes the appearing approaches to exclude the group from the political arena as for instance when 
the protests got violent. Mustafa believes that the government sent such people to some areas and; 
 
“The official, which is the governmental media, took advantage to ruin the picture and the image of 
hirak. So they were putting banners in the streets saying that the real development is not with 
burning, the real development is not with putting on fire, so the people believed in that as if we were 
the people doing that, but that was not the hirak” 
(Appendix B, p. 21). 
 
Adding that he believes people really loved the Social Hirak before this change but it was not 
possible for him and the other activists to; “get back the compass to the right direction” (Appendix 
B, p. 20). In relation to how the regime is acting strategically it is inevitable to notice how Mustafa 
and Ali are very critical towards King Abdullah II, and especially Mustafa has experienced the 
consequences of openly insulting him, clearly underlining Foucault’s points about repression as 
someone being silenced, making it hard and dangerous to speak up (1978). This reflected in two of 
the times Mustafa was arrested. Firstly after saying, that God should take revenge of the person that 
gave the Prime Minister his position, referring to the King. The second arrest came after a 
demonstration Mustafa had arranged, because a man got arrested in front of his kids after he had 
criticized the system, where Mustafa insulted the King and queen for portraying themselves as 
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fighting for children’s welfare but apparently not in this case. These cases show that the high degree 
of repression in Jordan limits equality such as freedom of speech (Albrecht, 2010). 
 
Another strategic act from the regime is when the National Dialogue Committee was initiated to 
show that the debate about demands was embraced, inviting the various oppositional forces to sit 
around the table, which reflects the use of ‘exclusive responsiveness’ since a certain support from 
the society is needed for the regime to survive (Albrecht, 2010). But as pointed out by Ali; “the 
ones representing hirak, we were against the idea and we didn’t participate” (Appendix C, p. 34) 
This incidence reflects how Mustafa and Ali made use of the ‘exit strategy’ of not participating due 
to their previous more ‘mixed-voice’ strategy of participating in meetings though continuing their 
critics out openly (Albrecht, 2010). 
 
The points above show that Mustafa and Ali as speakers are controlled by both external and internal 
procedures respectively not being allowed to say everything everywhere, and the internal 
procedures as the cultural system, in this case not allowed insulting the royalists as a well kept 
retold discourse (Foucault, 2001). Moreover when they mention the repressed terms, certain 
awareness about being rebellious and passion about the change fought for is reflected, to speak up 
against the powers (Foucault, 1978) but moreover to distance themselves from the other actors 
accepting the system’s terms. This is linked to how storytelling is a strategy to maintain a sense of 
agency in the confrontation with disempowering circumstances (Jackson, 2002). In that way, 
Mustafa and Ali use their narratives to appear as stubborn serious fighters that dismiss following the 
rules of the game contra creating new ones, which express their sense of agency of wanting to 
belong to something bigger (Ibid.). Possibly being the anti-system opposition against the regime’s 
forms of co-optation though with elements of a tolerable opposition as independent from the state 
but at times accepting when dialogue with the authorities is doable (Albrecht, 2010). 
The Jordanian Uprisings 
Hadia, Aisha, Thaer and Fadwa also express how they have been exposed to different kinds of 
repressive means by the authorities. The ‘divide-and-rule tactic’ (Albrecht, 2010) is first and 
foremost highlighted by Thaer that believes the power structures are intentionally dividing people in 
the region to repress them; “the more we are divided the more they can rule” (Appendix G, p. 80). 
Thaer’s acknowledgment of the powerful regime was also reflected from his specific wish for being 
anonymous in the interview related to a certain fear of having his critical opinions reviled stating 
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that; “I have said several things in this interview that can get me to jail for the rest of my life” 
(Appendix G, p. 86) reflecting the fear of how repression in Jordan limits potential equality and can 
have harsh consequences (Albrecht, 2010). 
 
Fadwa also refers to how the system is using repression against the claims of youthfulness (Bayat & 
Herrera, 2010a) and participation of youths in political means, as when she with the organization 
tried to implement more decentralization in dialogue with ministries that had replied with; “don’t 
think of anything political. Nearly all administrative things, no access to budget, no shadow 
governments” (Appendix D, p. 45). Since her welcomed negotiations with the authorities were 
based on the aim for youth to hold the government accountable for commitments, this reflects a 
hope for ‘adaptive capacities’ being flexibility for changing circumstances (Albrecht, 2010) though 
the result actually reflected ‘exclusive responsiveness’ which is meeting a certain degree of 
demands but with the strategic purpose to neutralize the people (Ibid.). 
 
The repressive means from the regime of limiting the opposition and challenging it to organize and 
campaign (Albrecht, 2010), is to the extent of using threats (Cavatorta & Durac, 2011) and pointed 
out by Fadwa and Hadia that both highlight the anti-terror law as being repressive. Fadwa explains 
how it was emerged in 2008 for national security reasons but was modified in 2014 because of fear 
of spill-over from Syria making it more elastic since anything can be a crime of terror, sending a 
signal of horror, since “a simple tweet can mark you as a terrorist” (Appendix D, p. 46). This 
reflects the point that the Middle Eastern region lacks democracy because of the strong 
consideration of security, forcing them to lower voices more repressively (Albrecht, 2010). Hadia 
retells how people participating in demonstrations got afraid; “That’s why people now are afraid to 
do or to say anything because we have laws that will say that you are a terrorist if you express your 
opinion” (Appendix F, p. 67), whilst confirming that people are currently arrested because of posts 
on Facebook. The anti-terror law is in that way an example of strategic repressive moves made by 
an authoritarian regime to limit the people (Albrecht, 2010). 
 
Of other harsh repressive approaches Hadia continuously refers to the violent aspects in the riots as 
getting beaten up and arrested which makes the structure of her narrative leaving an impression of a 
hardcore female fighter referred to the various times she uses ‘we’ in sentences about the beatings 
although when being asked directly revealing that she personally was never arrested. The 
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informants also refer to the ‘soft repression’ such as surveillance (Albrecht, 2010), their phones 
being watched and exposure of the youth through the media. Aisha experienced the surveillance 
when her computer was hacked which; “scared the shit out of me to be honest” (Appendix E, p. 62) 
after publishing the article arguing against increased war participation as a consequence of the 
pilot’s death. But she believes people are expecting to be watched leading her to remark; “when you 
are a Jordanian and you are talking or you are defending someone who is, you should expect that 
you are being watched” (Appendix E, p. 62). This all reflects the point that Arab activists’ fears of 
being under surveillance have an impact on interactions in public spheres (Onodera, 2009) as when 
Aisha says; 
 
“Surveillance affects people’s political participation and it affects their sayings, very often they 
don’t want to say things or they don’t want to support you online or don’t want to go out in 
demonstrations because they know they will be watched” 
(Appendix E, page 63). 
 
Aisha therefore adds how the typical factor for intermediation is to investigate in the social media. 
Hadia confirms this when mentioning how the authorities tried to pacify the female youth via media 
as how inappropriate it was with girls interfering, reflecting the point that culture about gender can 
be very complex for Arab youth (Bayat & Herrera, 2010a). According to Hadia the authorities use 
rumors as a tool to make people talk badly about the female activists, thus reflecting the use of ‘soft 
repression’ (Albrecht, 2010). For instance when she was exposed to the Secret Service making a 
fake Facebook profile of her scattering pictures of her, spreading rumors about her being pregnant 
while her husband was in jail before they got married which she claims; “they did it because they 
felt that we were going to ruin this country (…) to say that hirak is both boys and girls and this 
stuff, that they love each other” (Appendix F, p. 67). This is what she also believes the female 
activists fear; that their reputation is in danger since “in Jordan, the culture, the reputation counts a 
lot” (Appendix F, p. 71). This highlights the point that the youths have to work hard to gain respect 
and have to live up to high expectations (Schielke, 2009). These culturally conditions in the 
conservative Jordan, moreover reflects the point that even alternative presence by youth can be a 
threat for the authorities (Bayat, 2010). 
 
In relation to that Thaer, Hadia and Aisha all acknowledge the role of media in both a suppressing 
and a flourishing way, reflecting how social media is important for Arab youth to express their 
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political opinions and their dissatisfaction with the lack of freedom for political circumstances 
(Hoffman & Jamal, 2012). Respectively suppressing when Thaer states that the media intentionally 
chooses a new enemy every fifth year e.g. the Gulf countries, shia Muslims or Islamic State (IS) to 
take away the focus from other news. Nevertheless the social media is also flourish for them as 
when Aisha expresses her opinions via articles, Thaer writing politically for an online magazine, 
and Hadia highlighting social media as; “It is good because we have a place to say what we want 
because otherwise we can’t” (Appendix F, p. 74). Overall this reflects Bayat’s points how the 
youths are trying to claim their own social and cultural spaces, that either being in the streets or 
online by transforming from ‘young people’ to ‘youth’ which is necessary to act as collective 
challenges to the authorities but the regime is the countermeasures trying to keep them down 
(2010). Despite that, there are not a lot of censoring restrictions against the tools, such as social 
platforms, which Thaer explains is because it mostly is for individual efforts that vanish again, since 
it is not organized, which means that the government allows relatively free media (Albrecht, 2010). 
 
The informants also claim that the regime is attempting to use ‘exclusive responsiveness’ since 
certain actors in society cannot be completely ignored, but the embrace of their demands is a 
strategic move to neutralize them politically (Albrecht, 2010). As when Hadia underlines that the 
Prime Minister is only symbolic since; “the king here in Jordan is controlling things like he had 
puppets in his hands” (Appendix F, p. 68) and that they did not get any of their demands realized 
referring to that the dismissal of the Prime Minister was ‘only a plastic surgery you know, not real 
reform’ (Appendix F, p. 68) as an expression for how the authorities are trying to keep the activists 
down with empty implementations. Or when Fadwa confirms this, claiming that the King is using 
PR stunts, as when firing the Prime Minister because of the increased prices to show he was with 
the people; “so he played his game” (Appendix D, p. 46) adding that this is partly the explanation 
why people attack the government over the King. Fadwa moreover explains that the promise of a 
reform was a smart strategy so silent the crowds (Appendix D, p. 45) adding that nothing has 
changed. This reflecting the theoretical point that when a repressed term is being mentioned, certain 
awareness about being rebellious is revealed as an eagerness to express the repeated terms to speak 
up against the powers (Foucault, 1978). 
 
The repressive elements to neutralize the people reflected above also go for the previous mentioned 
frustrations the young informants listed, bringing in the educational aspect. Their need for 
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uncovering the truth about the school system reflects Foucault’s point about criticism being to 
uncover thoughts to unveil what otherwise is being taken for granted (2000). They all believe that 
the educational system is limiting the youth with minimized and fake knowledge, all giving 
examples where educators were controlling and pacifying them. Thaer claims that the system is 
intentionally not providing them with thinking tools making the students “feel like shit” (Appendix 
G, p. 88) which is confirmed by Aisha stating that the system is not challenging the youths in a right 
way. 
 
Hadia adds that it is affecting the self-esteem and self-worth of individuals by criticizing the 
limitation of discussion topics in university as being; “based on fear and you don’t say anything 
because you will go to jail” (Appendix F, p. 73).  This reflects the theoretical point about the 
function of repression to silent the speaker with prohibition around the topic because it is taboo 
(Foucault, 2001), but moreover the point that criticism and transformation are inventible linked, to 
avoid criticism only being superficial (Foucault, 2000), which is a combination suppressed by the 
authoritarian structures in the school system. This is especially evident in the informants’ examples 
underlining the general fear in society to be critical toward the King; Aisha retelling how she in 
school got her critical paper about the King rejected; Hadia explaining that it is culturally rooted not 
to get rid of him; according to Thaer, people believe that if the Hashemite system goes, everything 
will explode; and Fadwa explaining how some strong royalists are using the same excuse as the 
regime of safety and comparing with other countries making them prefer the current situation. This 
reflects the influence of ‘external procedures’ such as not having the right to say anything moreover 
the impact of the ‘internal procedures’ being the cultural system (Foucault, 2001). These 
assumptions can possibly be reflections of intersubjectivity since the fear is based thoughts around 
unsuccessful results in the neighboring countries. 
 
The narratives reveal how the use of storytelling can be a strategic tool to maintain a ‘sense of 
agency’ in the confrontation with disempowering circumstances (Jackson, 2002). This being how 
they leave an impression of themselves as too knowledgeable to be fooled in contrast with their 
reference to other Jordanians that actually believe in the Hashemite Kingdom. In that way their 
narratives express need to belong to something bigger (Ibid.) as the enlightened young politically 
active Jordanians who even though being too pacified by the regime to make notable change, at 
least know what is going on as a way of attempting to gain control. The narratives diverges from the 
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various points of departures; Aisha bases it on her family background where it was allowed to be 
critical; Thaer from theory and ideological facts; Fadwa talks from the organizational level of 
having diplomatic knowledge; and Hadia comes out in a furious way as the strong woman with lots 
of courage directly attacking the King; 
 
“He is only good in interviews with foreigners because he has a perfect English and he is marketing 
himself as the man of freedom and man of shit, but he is, we are a poor country and the king has a 
palace, it is scary with the palaces he has and the cars, the power, and everything, and all of this is 
on him, he is responsible, no one else” 
(Appendix F, page 68). 
 
Her anger is also expressed via cultural and religious aspects reflecting the need to portray enemies 
as subhuman without morals (Jackson, 2002) and potentially reflecting her personal outrage from 
being a Muslim, when she attacks the King’s attempt to make use of ‘the representation dimension’ 
as appearing democratic, especially after 9/11 (Albrecht, 2010). During this time he portrayed 
Jordan as a country of moderate Islam; “He is a liar. What is true Islam? This is bullshit man. He is 
using religion in a very strategic way” (Appendix F, p. 73). 
 
This being backed up by Fadwa who refers to how the King made a speech in the European 
Parliament as a promotion for Jordan having liberal Islam and saying that; “’we don’t want any 
radical Islam’” (Appendix D, p. 48). Hadia moreover points out another use of ‘internal 
procedures’ of exclusion, coming from the cultural system (Foucault, 2001) as when the King uses 
Hashemite Kingdom to uphold his position; “he is pretending to be religious because he is a son of 
Hashemite, the prophet Mohammad and so you know, all that bullshit (…) he is using it in a way to 
manipulate people in a very bad way” (Appendix F, p. 73). In that way it seems like Hadia is 
attempting to use ‘the divide-and-rule’ tactic by dividing the King from the people by stating that 
they do not love him, they are just afraid of him underlined by; “he doesn’t speak, it is very hard 
not to speak the people’s language” (Appendix F, p. 72). When referring to his cultural absence 
from not having visited cities in south for a very long time, it reflects the importance to be rooted 
and have a certain sense of belonging (Jackson, 2002) that Hadia through her narrative is trying to 
deprive from the King.  
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Fadwa adds consequences of the King’s absence from the more radicalized areas in Jordan where 
people view the King as very liberal compared to their traditional tribal system. Since the youth’s 
need to claim their own social and cultural space is limited (Bayat & Herrera, 2010a), radicalization 
seems as an attractive option through which the youths can be heard instead. Fadwa highlights the 
tendencies from ‘the radicalization trap’ (Albrecht, 2010) that she claims the King uses against the 
Muslim groups in Jordan “trying to eliminate them from the government because they see them as 
more radical than they want the government to be” (Appendix D, p. 48). Fadwa explains this as a 
strategic tool for the King to promote himself as representing the liberal Islam. Here the regime’s 
high consideration of security (Albrecht, 2010) is brought in when Aisha states that the increased 
appearance of extremism has been used as an excuse by the King to participate in the coalition 
against IS. Fadwa moreover adds how the King strategically used the death of the Jordanian pilot to 
increase the attacks against IS; 
 
“(…) he knows to target emotions of people, these topics are very sensitive, the dignity, the pride, 
the national territory (…) there is something cultural about taking revenge, and he used these 
words ‘we will make revenge of the murder of our son’ and he made it visible for everyone, that this 
is your brother, so everybody got united for this issue and then you never heard about it again” 
(Appendix D, p. 47). 
 
This description confirms the point about ‘counter-narratives’ used in Egypt to highlight pride and 
attitude during hard circumstances (Onodera, 2011). But interestingly enough for the Jordanian 
case, the regime over the people was the one to benefit from it when they put up various banners 
around Amman picturing the pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh and use of the familiar words as mentioned. 
Hadia even claims that the media and the King worked together to benefit from the incident; 
“manipulate the people to think that it is a victory, it is not” (Appendix F, p. 72) trying to make the 
Jordanians feel proud of him fighting for their security, referring to that people who were previously 
against the coalition are now for it. 
 
 78 
 
Private picture of a sign in central Amman put by the government showing the pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh 
“Keep your head high, you’re a Jordanian” (translated) 
Interim Conclusion 
Throughout the above analysis, the second working question is addressed of how interactions 
between the regime and the actors take place in relation to the Jordanian uprisings. According to 
Mustafa and Ali the Jordanian regime is authoritarian, repressive and corrupt among several 
examples via censorship, surveillance and arrests as consequence of disturbing the political order 
and criticizing the King. Despite that, their active approach still reveals a certain allowance for their 
enthusiasm for the poor and marginalized that they wish to represent. Their narratives reveal how 
despite the regime trying to pacify them, they continue being stubborn and thereby a sense of 
belonging to an opposition that cannot be stopped that easily. According to the young activists, the 
Jordanian regime is authoritarian and repressive using violence, surveillance and restricted laws to 
neutralize the crowds. Moreover the use of exclusive responsiveness is specifically highlighted not 
only portraying the regime as strategic but also the activists as too smart to be fooled; reflecting 
their sense of belonging to the enlightened part of the population. Specifically Aisha wishes to be an 
opinion former; Hadia stands as a hardcore female activist; Thaer represents the intellectual activist; 
and Fadwa stands as an active diplomatic organization-worker. 
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Discussion 
The overall theme of this discussion is how the culture meeting between dominant narratives and 
Jordanian youth reflects the intersubjective that is shaping activists. It is therefore crucial to link the 
global-local perspective (Bayat & Herrera, 2010a) with the intersubjectivity consisting of social 
relations between the self and others (Jackson, 2002), as how these individuals present themselves 
as politically activists (Hastrup, 2003) in the negotiation for position and space for action. In that 
way, the third working question; how do the young political activists express the Academic 
Narrative and the Royal Narrative to influence on the category as activists and their potential for a 
strong narrative? will be addressed. 
 
In order to delve deeper into topics at hand, the discussion will be divided into two parts. The first 
part will discuss how the dominant narratives may influence the category of being activist. More 
specifically how the Academic Narrative paired with the Royal Narrative are influencing the young, 
politically active Jordanian in the way that they distance themselves from them. The second portion 
within part one of the discussion, will consider further perspectives as to how narratives about the 
West and its presence in Jordan are also potentially influencing the activist category. The second 
part will switch interchange focal points, the focus from narrative to category, and how the youth 
can potentially strengthen their category as activists, possibly even reinforcing their own narrative. 
This will be highlighted with a discussion of political awareness and the aim of more organization. 
Lastly, the relationship to contemporary global world will be explored and its potentiality in 
bringing more flexibility to the category of activist.  
The Power of Narrative on Activists 
From the perspective of the Academic Narrative, real riots did not appear in Jordan anyway; the 
population is too divided between East Bankers and Palestinian-Jordanians and the regime is simply 
just making cosmetic reforms. Since ‘nothing really happened’ why even bother? According to the 
Royal Narrative, a lot of things did happened and were achieved such as the creation of the National 
Dialogue Committee, significant changes to the laws and the initiations that led to various other 
reforms. The young politically activists however, seem to disagree with both of the narratives. 
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Impact of Intersubjectivity 
On the one hand, the young informants are distancing themselves from the Academic Narrative by 
stating that significant political events during the years have had a positive influence on the 
development in Jordan. On the other hand, they are also distancing themselves from the Royal 
Narrative, criticising the proclaimed positive changes. In the aim of presenting the arguments from 
the Jordanian youth, I am inspired by Schielke and his point that the Arab Spring can be highlighted 
in an either positive or negative sense (2011). In this case though, I will extend upon Schielke to 
include the significant political events during the past years. I will in that way discuss the 
interesting mixture of statements portraying both positive and negative outcomes. These contrasts 
prove how narratives influence intersubjectivity. Inspired by Valbjørn, I am further encouraged to 
view the Arab Spring, or other political events in this case, as a ‘third-in-between’ instead of a 
‘transition to democracy’ or as a ‘transition to nowhere’ (Valbjørn, 2012).  
 
Fadwa claims that the Arab Spring affected the Jordanian youth in a way that they started to think 
more about their rights. She argues that the broader narratives have influenced the Jordanian youth 
by making them consider why, the protests started in Egypt before Jordan. Despite an increased 
focus on youth in Jordan since 2010 by NGOs and governmental institutions, Fadwa also argues 
that there have not been any specific changes felt by the Arab Spring. Thaer also agrees with the 
notion that the Arab Spring has increased thinking, since he believes that individuals are now, in 
general, beginning to question the authorities more because of increased media exposure and loose 
ends created by further reading. Thaer also believes that each regional episode makes Jordanians 
question more and as a side effect, become more politically aware, though collectivism, as a strong 
force for change, is still lacking. This is in contrast to Mustafa that argues for the success of 
collectivism – since the creation of the Worker’s Union – in relation to break with the two main 
challenges. First defeat is of an organization one; that the people were previously not used to 
demanding for something collectively. The second came as the hands of the government, who acted 
swiftly against collective gatherings, wanting people to act individually. Mustafa in this way claims 
that their overcoming of these defeats has made other societal groups become so inspired by the 
Dibarn people’s collective appearance and have since gathered to fight for their rights. 
 
In contrast to inspiration from within Jordan, Aisha is another one, who also believes, that the Arab 
Spring was the motivational spark for the Jordanian uprisings; she accredits it with having freed 
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many people meaning that they have a cause to fight for and it increased people’s interest in politics 
with a more direct relationship to it. In that way, the intersubjectivity between the narratives in the 
region and the Jordanian youth is once again argued as influencing their awareness. Furthermore, 
Aisha clearly proclaims herself as a freed individual. She claims that this is so because of her 
interest and criticism of first the Egyptian rulers and then the Jordanian regime, once again an 
argument of how global narratives are affecting overall consciousness of Jordanian youth. 
Unfortunately, Aisha also feels that others have been entrapped by the Arab Spring making them 
feel as if no process has been made for their cause. Hadia is an example of this under achievement 
when she confesses being depressed from lack of success.  
 
Though somewhat depressed by the results, Hadia also confesses to positive developments. These 
positive changes have been seen in the growth of demonstrations since 2011. Not only that, but 
these demonstrations – which previously revolved around Palestinian causes – have even spread to 
include otherwise forbidden topics such as removal of the Prime Minister. This is a clear picture 
that shows a development in the Jordanian youth’s political awareness as a result of the 
intersubjectivity with the narratives of regional protests. This link is made even stronger by Aisha, 
who believes that people’s increased exposure to online and social media has heightened their 
awareness of the global community and outside narratives. Though Hadia agrees in the expansion 
of online sharing, she feels it has negatively impacted awareness-making in the streets. This she 
argues is because people would rather share their opinions online. 
 
Thaer agrees with the concern and adds that since the Arab Spring, any young individual with 
political opinions have been attacked by the critics who claim that the youth in Jordan are simply 
stirring for another Syrian situation. Besides these accusations, Thaer also argues that the meeting 
with the Syrian refugees, as a consequence of war, has further discouraged the Jordanian youth in 
using their voices politically. Here I can conceptualize the intersubjectivity between the narratives 
about Syria and the creation of Islamic State (IS) and how they have influenced the youth in Jordan. 
Mustafa and Ali also argue that the Social Hirak retreated when they saw the effects of the war in 
Syria as well as the increased use of violence in protests. Aisha furthers this claim by stating that 
the elevated radicalization and existence of IS has made people scared and politically inactive. This 
argument is underlined by several of the informants when they argue that the murder of the pilot by 
IS had the impact of changing the otherwise pessimistic position against Jordanian participation in 
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the coalition against IS, has now changed to be in general more acceptable. The above arguments 
potentially reflect Aisha’s statement that even though it seems like nothing is going on in the 
Jordanian society its citizens are politically and easily end up in political discussions.  
Western Impact on Youth 
In addition to the aforementioned obstacles, the influence from the West is also argued by the 
informants as an obstacle for change. Though in contrast, stands their hope for internal moves. I 
will discuss how the presence of the West in Jordan may also influence Jordanian politically active 
youth in the negotiation for position and space for action. This takes a theoretical starting point in 
Arab youth and the struggle for rights in a post-9/11 time, arguing that outcomes of international 
policies and global flows are affecting (Bayat & Herrea, 2010a) their intersubjectivity and the 
activist category. 
 
Starting with Fadwa, she argues that one of the reasons why potential riots are kept to a minimum is 
because of Jordan’s strategic geographical placement and the peace agreement with Israel. 
According to Fadwa, the USA is benefitting substantially from these geopolitical agreements, that 
they will use any given force to keep Jordan safe, also from internal riots. Hadia argues, however, 
that there is still hope for internal riots leading to changes. She states that the continuation of poor 
living conditions inflation causing increased expensive to living; poor educational systems and 
corruption make it inventible. In sum, Hadia argues that there will come a time when the Jordanian 
people will reach their breaking point. Even though, Mustafa argues that the relationship between 
the West and Jordan is exactly why, the people will not make a costly revolution. Because, as he 
argues, the consequence will be that the USA will send material supports like weapon, in their 
steady support to the Jordanian regime. Thaer adds, that the several loans from the IMF, that 
includes various economical and political adjustments in the Jordanian system, is an indirect 
occupation that is making people more poor. In that way he believes, that the western influence in 
Jordan is not only challenging his perhaps utopian dream of a united Arab region, but it is making 
Jordan into a foreign aid country. This leaves Jordan on shaky ground; any sign of instability albeit 
economic or political can have fatal consequences. This, he argues, is rooted in the lack of 
knowledge he believes the Jordanians have. 
 
The liberal economy and IMF loans are also mentioned by Fadwa as an argument for why people in 
the conservative city Maan distance themselves from the King for they consider him as too liberal. 
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Hadia confirms this by arguing that the lack of royal visits to the southern areas, reflects the King 
desire does not care about the people but only about the lifestyle uphold by the Americans wanting 
him to stay in the powerful position. The choice of liberal economies and the influence from the 
West is argued by Ali as an intentional political choice to make Jordan weaker to relieve the Israel-
Palestine conflict while Jordan functions as an alternative country. As a result, Jordan will be so 
weak and in need of solutions that it would accept whatever came initiatives from external 
countries. This includes money and big loans, in return of allowing more refugees and especially 
the willing from Israel. Ali believes that it is allowance from the international community that 
controls which direction the regional Arab Spring is going. One example is how the Muslim 
Brotherhood took over Egypt. 
 
This is also reflected in Fadwa’s description on the blame placed on the USA by the people of 
Jordan. She states that some people believe the USA invented IS which she disagrees with by 
arguing that the creation of IS, is a result in the Arab’s own marginalization of the youth. Hadia 
believes that one way to combat IS issues in Jordan, is to increase salaries and education, so that the 
Jordanians do not need to join IS in order to increase their salaries and thereby their standard of 
living. But in contrast to this, Thaer argues that it is an American company that is controlling the 
content of the curriculums for Egypt, Palestine and Jordan anyways. Aisha, however, challenges 
this by believing in better enlightenment in the religious school books instead of fighting IS abroad. 
Here, Fadwa argues that even though the regime’s constant argumentation for strong security is 
decreasing the motivation for change, she still claims that the population now has more hope for 
opportunities and more space, since that is what they hear King Abdullah II promised them. Despite 
the negative attacks on the West, Thaer also keeps up the hope since he believes that change will 
come as a part of the Arab future history and highlights that without hope, there is no reason to live. 
The Power of Activist on Narrative 
The focus of this part of the discussion will be to show how the enhancement of the category of 
activist can strengthen its narrative. In doing so, I will use Ali’s argument that hirak is not only 
about protesting in the streets but also other kinds of interactions such as dialogue and awareness. 
Using this statement as a foundation, I will take things one step further and look into the 
possibilities of obstacles their political awareness can have in their quest for changes. The 
theoretical backbone will focus on of how one’s subjectivity and political awareness is practiced 
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dialogically and made up by internal and external voices and experiences, can make people 
commonly shift between various roles and influences within their subjectivities (Schielke, 2009).   
 
The overall argument throughout the narratives is that political awareness is needed to achieve 
change. Hadia maintains that it is essential that they increase their political awareness, so they gain 
an understanding of the bigger picture rather than reacting to single causes. Her argument is that, 
the lack of awareness is the reason behind why everything falls back into normal again. This can be 
argued as the fundamental aspect needed to be changed, in the aim of increasing political awareness 
and thereto the category of being an activist. This is essential why Hadia attacks the societal and 
educational system as responsible for whether or not people grow up thinking they will be 
imprisoned if they speak up about the vey taboo subjects of politics.  
 
Even though Aisha agrees in Hadia’s added comment that to be political aware means not being too 
emotional, she adds that political awareness should also consist of ideological insight, in the aim of 
being able to defend one’s opinions. Without any ideological fundament, reason, strategy or insight 
into human rights, Aisha believes that Jordanian youth just appear as over-emotional. She links this 
to the notion that strengthened political awareness should also include tools which enables 
Jordanians to structure their arguments. Aisha believes this is her advantage compared to others, 
because though she bases her articles on emotions, she claims she can defend it with reasons. 
 
Aisha also blames the political system for the population’s minimal ideological insight. This she 
argues, is rooted in ‘Emergency Laws’ from 1970s and 1980s as a consequence of the issues with 
PLO which banned political parties and university organizations, making people more active within 
tribes. She states that her grandfather, at that time, functioned as the head of the Secret Service and 
shortly as Prime Minister and he also confirms this, as the reason why Jordanians do not have 
widespread political awareness and thereby less politically active today. The argument presented by 
Mustafa, also agrees that the Jordanians are lacking in knowledge and that a solution for the almost 
invisible Jordanians is a bottom up approach starting from the level of awareness since he argues 
that a movement lacking in knowledge is just chaotic. In the argumentation for how people best can 
achieve more awareness it is interesting how Aisha and Fadwa disagree. Aisha arguing that youths 
like her, with many resources, are better positioned to express their opinions contra Fadwa that 
believes poor Jordanians, with unfulfilled needs, are really the ones demanding changes. 
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In contrast to the other informants, Thaer attacks the media for ruining the political awareness when 
they create misconceptions and manipulates who to be coined as the enemy. Thus it can be argued, 
that the abovementioned arguments reflect Thaer’s description of what it consists of to be political 
aware: consisting of having both knowledge and practice that he argues as a challenge for being 
organized, since Jordanians only have either one of them. He argues that the Jordanian youth either 
only speak up online without demonstrating or protest without having any background knowledge. 
This description leans towards Ali’s portrayal of himself as an activist; following up on the latest 
national and international cases and reacting to them with tools, such as social media or interactions 
in the streets. It can in that way be argued as a strength for the activist category in Jordan that 
people up in their 30s as Ali, or even above, are included in the category, because of the wish for 
the more the merrier to be organized. This reasoned in how Ali sees himself as belonging to their 
generation from a cultural perspective. Overall this shows how several units and events are 
influencing the youths’ subjectivities and political awareness accusing various sources of being 
responsible for affecting their common positions with others in society and frames for their category 
as activists (Schielke, 2009) with this common understanding, reflecting intersubjectivity. 
Youth as Category 
The starting point for this part is inspired by the statement by Aisha in which she says that 
Jordanian youth need a success story. This leads to the discussion of whether a stronger activist 
category can help in achieving a stronger narrative. This is further viewed from the theoretical point 
of need to transform from ‘young people’ into ‘youth’ as a social category in the aim of achieving 
demands (Bayat, 2010). Further theoretical inspiration will be found from the acknowledgement 
that youth is an analytical category with cultural values and norms in relation to social change 
(Hoffman & Jamal, 2012). The main argument for wanting to strengthening the category appears to 
be organizational grounded, however as I will show, the biggest obstacle in achieving this is fear 
from the population and therefore, I will also show an array of opinions as to how the activist 
category can be strengthened.  
 
According to Fadwa, the most effective way to achieve demands is via NGOs, rather than riots, 
since it would encourage more direct dialogue with the ministries for more youth participation. This 
however, demands dedication from the Jordanian youth whom – according to Aisha – are already 
under constant stress about the future, trapping them in a “bubble” (Appendix E, p. 57) challenging 
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the youth in having any interest in giving back to society. Instead, Aisha argues for the importance 
of social platforms in order to gain more knowledge so Jordanian youth can fulfil their right in 
questioning the established ideas about society instead of simply recycling their parents’ political 
opinions. This though, is the part of being a political activist, which Hadia argues is difficult for 
many to go against the grain and disagree with the accepted discourses in society. Hadia believes 
though that the efforts would be worth it. This backed up by Thaer arguing that the demonstrations 
have bought positive feelings, but they would not be enough for their efforts as Thaer claims that 
Jordanians in general would rather be safe than sorry. 
 
Here, it is interesting to bring in the argument by King Abdullah II. That engagement in the society 
should simply be in the regime-friendly political settings as within the parliament and government. 
Thaer however, attacks this by arguing that the whole political system is corrupt and it is only 
possible to run for parliament if a person is either very rich or belongs to a tribe. Despite the royal 
promises to make reforms within these settings, Hadia regrets not having asked for the fall of the 
King. This attitude against the King though, is problematic, if the aim is to gather the population in 
organizational ways. As Aisha argues, a general assumption in society is that if one is against the 
Hashemite, than you are also seen as being against Jordan. Hadia is aware of this perception in the 
population and explains it as a fear of chaos between the groups of Palestinians, Jordanians and 
Syrians, if the King falls. 
 
Thaer also wishes for the King to fall, but he argues that it should be done by an organised group, 
such as a social movement, where there are clear goals, strategy and vision. Perhaps such groups 
could arguably be organized unions such as the Worker’s Union and the Democratic Youth Union? 
They have clear goals, operating as umbrella’s to gather other groups and manage the coordination 
of common mobilization. This was clearly shown from the demonstration that took place in various 
cities all over the country on January 14, 2011. They are even stubborn enough to let the 
mobilization be consistent despite arrests or other suppressive means by the regime and are aiming 
to represent the people not just workers or leftists. Though Thaer partially agrees with the 
organizational aspect, he disagrees with the notion that the people should be in charge. Thaer 
believes political law to be the most organized way to rule and that people are simply too 
unorganized. Despite the strength of the unions, they have also been unsuccessful for two reasons; 
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one being the Muslim Brotherhood that were more organized and the other being the increase and 
violence and thus an increase in fear. 
 
Fear is several times stated as an obstacle for organization and a strengthened category of being 
activist, as when Hadia argues that fighting the fear is the biggest challenge for the Jordanian youth 
to achieve change. No matter how organized a group one could be a part of, they would still be 
afraid of losing their jobs or being punished to the same degree as a terrorist from simply posting 
their opinions online. Moreover the fear of being beaten up at the demonstrations or be exposed to 
rumours about them, as Hadia experienced herself. On this topic, Fadwa argues that another 
obstacle is the lack of self-knowledge Jordanians have and how this results in lack of courage to 
look inwards. Fadwa furthers her argument by saying that their need to blame others for harsh 
conditions is rooted in a feeling of being forgotten. An example is when they blame Iraqi refugees 
for using resources and Syrians for taking jobs. This, says Fadwa, is especially present between 
tribes, when one blame another to makes one’s own image look better. Since the tribes are a big part 
of the society, these tensions may add to the challenge of organizing and unite within Jordan. 
 
Why not work together with the tribes to be more organized and thus, strengthen the category of 
activist? Though as argued by Thaer, that the uprisings could have been expanded if the tribal youth 
had also participated, it would not necessarily have been to their benefit. According to Thaer, the 
reasons the tribes are not obvious allies is because they can rule by their own laws. Jordanian tribes 
have their own exclusive system of rule and therefore they have no interest in rupturing the current 
structure in fear of losing their privileges. Thaer continues by saying that it is not only the tribes that 
benefit from their cooperation, but also the Kingdom itself. This is because a divided society is not 
as strong against the Hashemite Kingdom as a united one. Thaer highly doubts that a secular more 
democratic system would allow the approach by the tribes.  
Youth as Generation 
As mentioned, the Jordanian youth need a success story. Whether this is through improved 
organization or increased political awareness, they need something that can empower their category 
as activists, their own narrative and finally their success story. I have to question however, how 
necessary it actually is to belong to a category to achieve this, in the global world of today. I will in 
addition bring in theoretical inspiration of youth rather representing a generation. This is from the 
importance to understand the concept of a global generation and how generational consciousness is 
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being shaped in relation to how the human rights have created moral and political compass for 
people (Bayat & Herrera, 2010a). This reflection of intersubjectivity will challenge several of 
Foucault’s points about power (1978, 2000 & 2001) in the attempt to create a stronger narrative. 
 
On the one hand, the lack of achievements by the Jordanian activists can be argued as rooted in how 
transformation for change is only possible with criticism. And if the combination of these two does 
not appear, adjustments will simply stay superficial (Foucault, 2000) as the informants are also 
claiming the initiatives for reforms to be, which underlines the argument that without a strong 
political awareness, their fights will appear as failures. Nevertheless, when the unions live up to the 
criteria of being organized, they claim to have achieved more than the youth during the Jordanian 
uprisings, but the Academic Narrative still leaves them in the background. This can be argued from 
two varying perspectives. First, the habit of portraying the secular and leftist opposition in Middle 
Eastern countries as weak, as reflected in the historical chapter, and secondly, even though the 
Academic Narrative acknowledges the southern cities, as where riots in newer times were initiated, 
the ones from 2011 are argued as a starting point. The unions, however, argue that the fights were 
actually started by them in 2006. These points prove the power of the narratives. They also act as a 
reminder, of the academia responsibility in portraying the Jordanian riots. 
 
On the other hand it can be argued that the Arab Spring is an example of how youth through their 
reactions and protests may not have achieved successful revolutions that lead to democracy yet, 
often argued from the lack of fixed plans for alternative rule, but they have in the least achieved 
global acknowledgement. This is reflected by the dominant academic scholars directed at the 
international community. Here, bringing in the second point made by the Academic Narrative, that 
youth are still acknowledged for having achieved some change with their protests. From this 
perspective, Foucault’s statement that no power is conducted without aims and objectives (1978) is 
challenged by the point that even the alternative presence of youth is powerful enough (Bayat, 
2010) to affect the royal regime. This also confronts the notion that the speaker is under control and 
should live up to certain criteria (Foucault, 2001). The Jordanian youth have challenged this notion 
in the creation of their narrative via social media. This challenges another of Foucault’s points that 
power should always be located at the extreme points (1980). The power of narratives, that are 
presented in past tense and affected by intersubejctive reflections actually heavily influence the 
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category of being an activist. In that way, the importance of making fights more visible is verified 
(Foucault, 2000), thus the ways and use of sources to do that have been expanded. 
 
In that way, it can be argued that use of social media determine the presentation of who that are 
Jordan’s main politically activists. It can in that way be argued, that despite the unions’ strong 
organizational skills, the young activists in the Jordanian uprisings have a bigger potential to come 
out with a strong narrative globally. This is potentially because their focus reflects global rights 
rather can local worker’s concerns or simply because they make up the majority in Jordan. The 
downside however, is that, possibility for change in Jordan arguably depends on the themes that 
circulate globally such as those seen with strong ties to the West and its interests. This not only 
questions whether there is a need for better organization and deeper political awareness, but 
moreover how fragile the activist category is in its influence by narratives. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I will highlight the power of the narratives by addressing the research question; 
based on ethnographic research among Jordanian politically active youth, this thesis asks how 
narratives of these young Jordanians reflect the influence of recent and significant political events 
on their negotiation for position and space for action. I will conclude how the fight over the 
narratives is an attempt by the actors to write themselves into the story of Jordan and its 
development. These are results from working specifically with the theory of narrative; theory of 
power and authoritarianism; and with inspiration from academic research in the Middle East. 
 
As it has been shown, narratives by the Jordanian youth have revealed both challenges and 
advantages for them to negotiate their position and space for action. I argue, that cultural encounters 
between dominant narratives and young politically active Jordanians reflect their intersubjectivity. 
The power of the narratives is, in that way, shaping their category as activists and their narrative.  
 
I can conclude that the fight over the narratives affect the young Jordanian activists’ space for 
action. This is shown when all actors attempt to grasp the power of narrative. By practicing the 
strategies behind the theory of narrative which attempts to transform the private into public and also 
gain a sense of agency in confrontation with disempowering circumstance. King Abdullah II and 
Osama are doing this via the Royal Narrative by respectively positioning the King as pro-Arab 
Spring, and setting the tone for democratic development. This narrative highlights Jordan’s positive 
advantages in an otherwise critical situation. Mustafa and Ali highlight their union’s fight for 
development in Jordan as against the oppressive regime and themselves as more successful before 
the appearance of the Arab Spring. This outs distance between their space for action and the 
Jordanian uprising and its failures. Thaer, Aisha, Hadia and Fadwa are using strategies to create 
their narratives by distancing their space for action from the main messages by the Academic 
Narrative and the Royal Narrative. These are that ‘nothing really happened’ in opposition to 
positive outcomes; and initiatives for reform, defined by the youths as cosmetic, as a take-off to 
criticize the authorities. In addition to global narratives regarding significant political events and the 
regional surroundings as either extending or minimizing the space for action, also reflect the power 
of intersubjectivity.  
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Furthermore, I will conclude how the dominant narratives also influence the informants’ negotiation 
for position as young politically activists in Jordan. Through their narratives, the informants 
underline themselves as being suppressed by the Hashemite regime by various means. This also, 
reveals how intersubjectivity between themselves and the regime influences their desirable 
positions within activism. Mustafa and Ali position themselves as belonging to an organized brave 
and stubborn opposition force that instead of playing by the rules make up their own. Thaer, Aisha, 
Hadia and Fadwa position themselves overall, as enlightened youths, aware of their global rights 
and the strategic means of the Hashemite regime, making them stand out as too aware to be fooled. 
These statements reflect how the informants position themselves as respectively more organized 
and more aware activists than the dominant narratives attempt to portray them as.  
 
Finally, I can conclude that when narratives influence the negotiation for position and space for 
action, it shows how fragile the category of being an activist is overall. This is first and foremost 
underlined in various ways of being an activist as shown via the ethnographical fieldwork. The 
results reveal tendencies of which the category of being an activist in Jordan consists of. However, 
as argued, this concept of category is also challenged by the youth generation. From this, I have 
argued that in hopes of creating a strong narrative, an obstacle may be actually belonging to a 
category, such as leftist opposition, rather than a global generation shaped by a generational 
consciousness, such as young activists. I have therefore, questioned whether the expressed desires 
of empowering the category of activist via organization and awareness is still as needed in the 
global world of today as previously. From that, I can conclude that the power of the narratives is 
also rooted in the amount of reflection of the global settings and in this case seen in relation to the 
strong ties between Jordan and the West. 
 
In sum, I have touched upon my point of interest as to how narratives can potentially affect the 
intersubjectivity of the Jordanian activists. Topics of whether Jordanians actually care about 
domestic and international issues have also been explored. This has enabled me to exclude that pure 
ignorance can exist in the middle of a region in turmoil. As the centre of this, Jordan is still standing 
as the country of consequences. 
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Further Perspectives 
 
“Jordan today is more stable than at any period in the past. Jordan is the country that passed 
through the Arab Spring safely, even though there were many revolutions in the region” 
(Jumana Ghneimat, Editor-in-Chief for Al Ghad newspaper, 2015) 
 
This quote from last month proves the point right, that King Abdullah II predicted four years ago; 
that Jordan after the Arab Spring would come out as a good story for him. Further reflections about 
the role of the media in regards to power of the narrative cannot go unnoticed. While neighbors are 
exposed to harsh reactions from powerful authorities, as an outcome of the Arab Spring, the media 
portrays Jordan as living up to its function as the country of consequences. This is to deal with the 
many refugees and assists with its geographical placement for geopolitical concerns. 
 
King Abdullah II was last month named as the world’s most influential Muslim because of his 
central role in the two most consequential conflicts in the world; the one over Palestine and the 
other against Islamic State (IS) (5pillars, 2015).8 This is reflected in a visit by the American 
Secretary of State John Kerry a few weeks ago, where Amman functioned as the base for 
management of the coalition against IS, and recent escalation of protests in Jerusalem (The 
Guardian, 2015). The King’s position is enhanced by the American President Barack Obama who 
has highlighted the initiatives for reforms in Jordan as a role model for democracy in the region, the 
desire for increasing this so needed, that if possible, King Abdullah II ‘should be cloned’. Thus 
Valbjørn questions this when highlighting the lack of reforms which should make global democratic 
forces think twice before legitimizing cosmetic initiatives to the detriment of actual changes 
(Politiken, 2008) This was underlined by Human Rights Watch last year stating that the Jordanian 
government should increase the space for public critical debate instead of punishing peaceful 
criticism (Human Rights Watch, 2014). In that way, the fight over the narrative of Jordan also has 
its power in the media. 
 
In reflections over how the power of narrative can be grasped by various actors in the global world, 
the importance of cultural encounters affecting intersubjectivity leads to reflections over the 
                                                 
8
 Ranged by ‘The Muslim 500’ compiled by the Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre in Jordan in cooperation with 
Prince Al-Waleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University in the United States 
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Jordanian identity. While it is often claimed as vague, with an unsteady foundation, the force of 
intersubjectivity and the power of narrative that includes is perhaps the foundation upholding the 
Jordanian identity. As seen in the media as either contrary to violent Syria or in solidarity with 
Palestine. While the fights over narratives influenced by different agendas take place, whether from 
powerful authorities, organizations or from grassroots level projects, the weigh on the academic 
shoulders does not get any lighter. This has been shown in, how academic narratives certainly also 
frame the understanding of negotiation over position and space for action for activists in Jordan. 
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